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  INTRODUCTION   
In the final months of 2017, Congress enacted the most ex-
pansive tax legislation in decades,1 with sweeping changes to the 
rules for taxing individuals and business, the deductibility of 
state and local taxes, and the international tax regime. The tax 
legislation2 was drafted and passed quickly through a rushed 
 
 1. See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); Samuel A. Donaldson, Under-
standing the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 1 (Ga. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Legal Stud-
ies Research Paper No. 2018-07, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=3096078 (“[This] represents the most dramatic change to the 
Internal Revenue Code since passage of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986. . . . Whereas the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the product of years of bi-
partisan negotiation, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was the product of a deeply 
partisan and largely closed-door process.”). 
For further discussion of extensive negotiations and deliberations resulting 
in the Tax Reform of 1986, see, for example, JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. 
MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UN-
LIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice 
and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Leg-
islation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
 2. Throughout this Article, we refer to the new legislation as the “2017 tax 
legislation,” or as just the “tax legislation.” The full name of the legislation had 
been the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” (TCJA), and many commentators continue to 
refer to the legislation by this name. However, the Senate parliamentarian 
ruled that this name was non-germane, resulting in the name being removed 
from the legislation. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Budget, Parlia-
mentarian Determines Three Provisions in Republican Tax Bill Are Impermis-
sible (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.budget.senate.gov/ranking-member/ 
newsroom/press/parliamentarian-determines-three-provisions-in-republican 
-tax-bill-are-impermissible. For further explanation, see Daniel Shaviro, The 
  
1442 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1439 
 
process,3 denying legislators and the public sufficient time to an-
alyze the provisions of the legislation—many of which are highly 
complex. 
This Article is an effort to supply the analysis and delibera-
tion that should have accompanied the bill’s passage, and de-
scribes key problem areas in the tax legislation.4 These problems 
are organized in three general categories: 
Tax Games. Many of the new changes fundamentally under-
mine the integrity of the tax code and draw new and arbitrary 
lines dividing the tax system into winners and losers. As a result, 
well-advised taxpayers will have new opportunities to game5 the 
rules and avoid taxes through strategic planning, while the IRS 
will have a hard time preventing abuse. Similarly, the new rules 
limiting the deductions for state and local taxes will invite states 
to adjust their forms of revenue collection to game the new rules, 
as some states are already doing.6 Official projections expect the 
 
Act with No Name, START MAKING SENSE (Dec. 21, 2017), http://danshaviro 
.blogspot.com/2017/12/the-act-with-no-name.html. 
 3. Edward Kleinbard, Senators Picked Americans’ Pockets Via Degraded 
Tax Policy Process, THE HILL (Dec. 4, 2017), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/ 
363096-senators-picked-americans-pockets-via-degraded-tax-process (“This 
time, the process has been so rushed and so secret that the Senate early Satur-
day morning voted on legislation that in part comprised handwritten amend-
ments stuck into the bill . . . . But the problems run much deeper than the break-
neck schedule.”). 
 4. This Article does not aim to offer a comprehensive list of problems with 
the new legislation. Rather, the Article identifies the most significant problem 
areas, and describes the most critical considerations that were not adequately 
addressed by Congress at the time of the tax legislation’s passage. Similarly, 
this Article is not intended as an indictment of every aspect of the tax legisla-
tion, which also included some beneficial updates to the Tax Code, such as the 
new limitations on the deductibility of business entertainment expenses or re-
ducing the corporate tax code’s preference for debt financing, even if that provi-
sion may face technical challenges. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, How Terrible 
Is the New Tax Law? Reflections on TRA17 (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Research 
Paper No. 586, Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-002, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3095830. 
 5. Following earlier work by David Gamage, we use the terms “tax games” 
and “tax gaming” to refer to both legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion, as 
well as to the large gray area of tax planning transactions that are neither 
clearly legal nor clearly illegal. See David Gamage, How Should Governments 
Promote Distributive Justice?: A Framework for Analyzing the Optimal Choice 
of Tax Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1, 5 (2014). That said, our focus in this Article 
is mostly on legal and borderline-legal forms of tax gaming. 
 6. See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman & Frank Sammartino, State Responses to 
the TCJA’s SALT Deduction Limit May Be Costly and Favor High-Income Res-
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tax legislation to cost more than $1 trillion7 while primarily ben-
efitting the wealthiest taxpayers.8 Taking into account the gam-
ing opportunities described in this Article, we expect that the 
actual distributional and revenue costs of the legislation will 
likely significantly exceed these projections.9 As this Article de-
scribes, there are no simple fixes for many of the gaming oppor-
tunities invited by the tax legislation.  
Roadblocks. Other changes in the tax legislation may inter-
fere with important non-tax policies and encounter legal road-
blocks. For example, critical elements of the changes to the in-
ternational tax system may cause the United States to violate 
international trade law.10  
Glitches. Finally, some problems with the tax legislation 
arise from mistakes or ambiguity in drafting that could lead to 
uncertainty and haphazard increases or decreases in taxes. Such 
problems are the most amenable to legislative or regulatory 
fixes, and do not seriously threaten the structure of the tax sys-
tem. These problems do evidence, however, Congress’s haste and 
the lack of care in drafting and passing the tax legislation. Taken 
together, the problems demonstrate how a rushed and secretive 
process resulted in deeply flawed legislation. Tax law is too com-
plex and interconnected to be reformed without transparency 
and public deliberation. By documenting the gaming opportuni-
ties, roadblocks, and glitches in the legislation, we hope that this 
Article will also serve as a cautionary note for future attempts 
at tax reform—warning legislators about the dangers of drafting 
tax law in the shadows, and the importance of a responsible and 
responsive process when making changes that affect every 
American taxpayer and every sector of the economy.  
 
 7. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., MACROECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND 
JOBS ACT” 9 tbl.1 (Comm. Print CMP-2017-JTX-0031). 
 8. See TAX POLICY CTR. STAFF, DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE CON-
FERENCE AGREEMENT FOR THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 1 (2017) https:// 
www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/distributional-analysis-conference 
-agreement-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/full (finding that the largest cuts as shares of 
income would go to taxpayers in the 95th to 99th percentiles). 
 9. The purpose of this Article is not to argue whether individuals or state 
entities should engage in these gaming opportunities or not, but rather to iden-
tify the gaming opportunities and their expected effects. For an argument that 
states should make adjustments to their revenue-collection methods in response 
to the tax legislation, see Daniel Hemel, Why States Should Seek to Offset the 
Effects of the SALT Rollback, MEDIUM: WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED (Feb. 2, 
2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/why-states-should-seek-to 
-offset-the-effects-of-the-salt-rollback-8a53fc23cbeb. 
 10. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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Before long, policymakers will inevitably be tasked with en-
acting further changes to the tax law in order to undo the legis-
lation’s harmful effects on the fiscal system.11 This Article also 
describes reform options for policymakers, in order to begin the 
process of restoring the integrity of the tax system and to initiate 
scholarly conversation on what comes next. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I an-
alyzes opportunities for taxpayers to use corporations as tax 
shelters under the tax legislation. By dramatically reducing the 
corporate tax rate without carefully considering the interactions 
between the corporate and individual income taxes, the tax leg-
islation will enable many taxpayers to use corporations as tax-
sheltered savings vehicles through a variety of strategies. We ex-
plain how the use of corporations as tax shelters can result in 
both investment and labor income being taxed at only the pref-
erential twenty-one percent corporate rate, rather than the 
higher individual-level tax rates which could exceed 40%.12 
Part II analyzes problems related to the new tax deduction 
provided for certain pass-through businesses. The complex rules 
governing this new deduction will invite gaming opportunities 
because there is no particular logic as to who clearly fits into the 
preferred categories. As a result, taxpayers will be incentivized 
to engage in aggressive and socially costly tax gaming to fall 
within the haphazardly drawn lines. This Part also discusses 
proposed regulations issued by Treasury in August 201813 to ad-
dress particular gaming strategies arising from the legislation, 
and how these regulations, if finalized, would still preserve op-
portunities for abuse. 
Part III describes how state and local governments might 
respond to the new cap on the federal deduction for state and 
local tax (SALT) payments. We explain how the structure of the 
new SALT deduction cap will incentivize state and local govern-
ments to restructure their forms of revenue collection so as to 
circumvent the cap. Such responses by state and local govern-
ments could well undercut one of the largest revenue raisers in 
 
 11. Furthermore, many important features of the tax legislation were made 
temporary, virtually guaranteeing further significant legislation within the 
next decade. See TAX FOUND. STAFF, PRELIMINARY DETAILS AND ANALYSIS OF 
THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 10 (2017) (noting the “temporary nature of the 
majority of the individual income tax changes”). 
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. Qualified Business Income Deduction, Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.199A, 
1.643, 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884 (Aug. 16, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
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the entire tax legislation, in addition to creating legal uncer-
tainty and other social harms. This Part similarly discusses pro-
posed regulations issued by Treasury that would address one 
possible response by state and local governments to the SALT 
deduction cap,14 as well as new pressures that would result from 
the regulatory approach. 
Part IV analyzes international games, roadblocks, and 
glitches. We explain how the tax legislation’s complex new rules 
intended to exempt foreign income of domestic corporations from 
U.S. taxation present a variety of tax gaming opportunities. For 
instance, one provision would encourage sales of products 
abroad, only for those products to be sold right back into the 
United States.15 Furthermore, several aspects of the new rules 
are likely to raise issues with both World Trade Organization 
rules for international trade and our network of bilateral tax 
treaties.16 Some of these rules also create perverse economic in-
centives, like advantaging foreign over domestic manufacturers. 
Part V describes some significant additional games and glitches 
arising from the legislation. 
I.  USING CORPORATIONS AS TAX SHELTERS   
Perhaps the most significant change brought by the 2017 
tax legislation was the reduction of the highest statutory corpo-
rate income tax rate from 35% to 21% percent.17 In this Part, we 
explain how this change will allow taxpayers to avoid the indi-
vidual income tax by using a corporation as a tax-sheltered sav-
ings vehicle. In effect, taxpayers will be able to transform indi-
vidual income—that would otherwise be taxed at the individual 
rates which could exceed 40%—into corporate income that is 
taxed at the much lower 21% rate.18  
The basic advantage to investing or earning income through 
a corporation is that the income is not immediately taxed to the 
individual taxpayer. The cost of earning income through a cor-
poration, however, is the “double tax” on the income, both to the 
 
 14. Contributions in Exchange for State or Local Tax Credits, Prop. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.164(b)(6), 83 Fed. Reg. 43,563, 43,569 (Aug. 27, 2018) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. I.R.C. § 11(b) (2017) (stating a top rate of 35%); id. § 11(b) (stating a top 
rate of 21%); H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 13,001 (2017) (enacted). 
 18. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(e). 
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corporation (when the income is earned)19 and to the individual 
taxpayer (upon a distribution or sale of their corporate inter-
est).20 Nevertheless, with a sufficiently low corporate tax rate, 
taxpayers can still benefit from earning income through a corpo-
ration, even in light of this potential double tax. In many cases, 
taxpayers will be able to entirely avoid the second individual 
layer of tax, and therefore escape double taxation entirely. 
Section A describes the general principles behind these 
planning opportunities, and Section B illustrates the specific 
games taxpayers can play in order to achieve these results. Fi-
nally, Section C describes opportunities for reform in order to 
prevent these games. 
A. THE TWO-STEP GAME FOR SHELTERING INCOME THROUGH A 
CORPORATION 
Tax gaming opportunities based on using a corporation21 as 
a tax shelter generally involve two steps. The first step is for the 
taxpayer to earn income through the corporation, rather than as 
an individual. The second step is for the taxpayer to defer or en-
tirely avoid the second individual layer of tax upon a distribution 
of the earnings from the corporation or from sale of the corporate 
stock. 
 
 19. Id. § 11(a). 
 20. A distribution or a sale of the corporate interest will be taxable to the 
individual as, respectively, a dividend or capital gain. Id. § 1(h). 
 21. For purposes of this discussion, references to a “corporation” refer to a 
“C corporation” subject to the entity-level corporate tax under I.R.C. §11 (spe-
cifically, a corporation as defined in section 7701(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code and section 301.7701-2(b) of the Treasury Regulations, which does not 
elect to be taxed as an “S corporation” under section 1362 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code). 
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1. Why the Two-Steps: A Game of Rates 
The two-steps are necessary for a taxpayer to generate sub-
stantial tax savings by earning income through a corporation 
and avoiding the individual layer of tax. There would be rela-
tively little tax savings if a taxpayer earned income through a 
corporation and then immediately distributed the earnings, trig-
gering the second individual layer tax. Importantly though, even 
if that second individual layer of tax is immediately triggered 
and paid, a taxpayer can still enjoy a slightly lower total tax rate 
on their income under the new tax legislation—unlike under 
prior law. As a result, earning income through a corporation is a 
win-win for the taxpayer: If the second layer of tax is immedi-
ately paid, the taxpayer still enjoys small potential tax savings; 
and if the second layer of tax is deferred or eliminated, the tax 
savings become much larger. 
 
The table above shows the relative rates affecting income 
earned by an individual (and taxed at the top individual rates) 
and the same income earned by a corporation and then distrib-
uted to the individual (with the distribution also taxed at the top 
individual rate). Ordinary income earned directly by a taxpayer 
is taxed at a top rate of 40.8% under the new law.22 If this same 
income is earned in by a corporation, the income is now taxed at 
a top rate of 21%.23 If the after-tax corporate income is then dis-
tributed to the taxpayer as a dividend, the proceeds are again 
 
 22. For example, ordinary investment income such as interest and rents is 
taxed at a top marginal rate of 37% under sections 1(a) and (j), plus the 3.8% 
Net Investment Income Tax under section 1411. 
 23. I.R.C. § 11(b). 
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taxed at top rate of 23.8%.24 Despite these two layers of tax, the 
income earned through the corporation and then immediately 
distributed is taxed at a combined effective rate of 39.8%,25 still 
less than the 40.8% rate if the income were earned directly by 
the individual.  
This example illustrates how the reduction in the corporate 
rate under the tax legislation favors income earned by corpora-
tions relative to income earned by individuals. Furthermore, 
even if the corporate income were immediately subject to the sec-
ond individual layer of tax (on capital gains or dividends), the 
combined rate is still slightly lower than the top ordinary rate 
for individuals.  
The benefit from earning income through a corporation is 
much greater, however, if the taxpayer can defer or entirely 
eliminate the second individual layer of tax. If the taxpayer can 
defer the second individual layer of tax by delaying distributions 
from the corporation, they can enjoy the benefit of what is essen-
tially a loan from the government, equal to the amount of taxes 
that are delayed to future tax years. This loan benefits the tax-
payer if the tax rate on the returns to investment within the cor-
poration is lower than the tax rate on those returns outside the 
corporation. If the taxpayer can entirely eliminate the individual 
layer of tax, the taxpayer’s earnings would only be taxed at the 
21% percent corporate rate, instead of the top individual rate in 
excess of 40%, allowing the taxpayer to cut their tax bill almost 
in half.  
2. How to Defer or Eliminate the Second Individual Layer of 
Tax  
The second step of the two-step—deferral or elimination of 
the second layer of tax—can involve a combination of different 
strategies. The first strategy is simply to not distribute funds out 
of the corporation for some period of time, thus avoiding the tax 
on dividends, and not selling the stock, thus avoiding the capital 
gains rates. If the stockholder wants access to cash, they can bor-
row against the stock (using the stock as collateral) without trig-
gering recognition of the income. This strategy defers the second 
layer of tax, reducing its actual cost to the taxpayer in present 
value terms. 
 
 24. The top marginal rate of 20% for qualifying dividends under section 
1(h)(11) plus the 3.8% Net Investment Income Tax under section 1411. 
 25. 21% + (23.8% x [1 – 21%]). 
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The taxpayer can then super-charge the tax advantage and 
completely eliminate the second layer of tax in several different 
ways. The first and perhaps easiest (from a tax planning per-
spective) strategy is to simply die while holding the corporate 
stock. The 2017 tax legislation retained the step-up in basis at 
death, which eliminates any built-in gain on assets held at that 
time.26 As a result, the appreciation in the corporation stock re-
sulting from the corporate earnings is not taxed to either the 
stockholder or their heirs and escapes the income tax altogether. 
The income is only taxed once at the lower 21% corporate rate. 
Death is not the only way for a taxpayer to escape the second 
individual layer of tax. A taxpayer planning for retirement can 
achieve a similar result by holding their corporate shares in a 
Roth retirement account. Upon retirement, the taxpayers would 
pay no additional tax either from receipt of distributions from 
the corporation or from sales of their corporate interests.27  
Taxpayers can reduce or eliminate the second individual 
layer of tax on corporate distributions through other tax rules. 
For instance, section 1202 of the Internal Revenue Code provides 
for at least partial exclusion of gain from certain small business 
stock.28 Taking advantage of this provision allows a taxpayer to 
partially avoid the second layer of tax on qualifying corporate 
distributions. Even more simply, a taxpayer can wait to receive 
distributions from the corporation until they are no longer work-
ing, and are consequently taxed in a lower individual income tax 
bracket.  
Of course, taxpayers could engage in these same strategies 
under prior law.29 The key difference is that, before the 2017 tax 
 
 26. I.R.C. § 1014. 
 27. Id. § 408A(d). The tax benefits of holding a closely held corporation 
through the Roth IRA may be disallowed in a case where a taxpayer does not 
engage in arm’s length transactions with the corporation. See INTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERV., NOTICE 2004-8 - ABUSIVE ROTH IRA TRANSACTIONS (2018), https:// 
www.irs.gov/businesses/notice-2004-8-abusive-roth-ira-transactions. Taxpay-
ers have apparently managed to overcome these rules when it comes to closely 
held corporations; for instance, this apparently includes putting founder’s stock 
into Roth IRAs. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-16, INDIVID-
UAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS: IRS COULD BOLSTER ENFORCEMENT ON MULTI-
MILLION DOLLAR ACCOUNTS, BUT MORE DIRECTION FROM CONGRESS IS NEEDED 
26–27 (2014). 
 28. I.R.C. § 1202. 
 29. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. 
LAW, INCOME TAX LAW xix, 12–15 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2012) (describing the 
“Buy/Borrow/Die” strategy that allowed taxpayers to reduce their tax liability 
on corporate investments even prior to the 2017 tax legislation). 
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legislation, the cost of the higher 35% corporate tax rate limited 
the benefit from these strategies, such that the strategies were 
previously unattractive to many taxpayers.30 By contrast, the 
structure of the income tax is poorly equipped to address the 
post-legislation scenario in which corporate income is taxed at a 
much lower top rate than is individual income. Thus, if Congress 
intends to preserve the low corporate tax rate, new rules will be 
needed to prevent widespread abuse. 
3. Current Anti-Abuse Rules Are Insufficient  
Taxpayers will not be able to use these strategies without 
limit, and these transactions may be subject to judicial, statu-
tory, and regulatory anti-abuse rules.31 However, many of these 
anti-abuse rules rely on IRS enforcement action, and these doc-
trines have been “notoriously ineffective” in the past.32 Further, 
we expect that the resource-constrained IRS will face significant 
barriers to addressing all of these gaming opportunities, espe-
cially in the short term. We also expect that the proliferation of 
new gaming opportunities will lead to a further diversion of tax-
payer resources away from productive activity and towards tax 
planning. 
B. EXAMPLES OF TAX GAMING USING CORPORATIONS 
The discussion above described the basic strategies to re-
duce or avoid tax by earning income through corporations. To 
illustrate the potential tax benefits from these strategies, we 
here use a set of simple hypotheticals involving $1,000 earned 
and invested by the taxpayer in various ways. In all the cases, 
we assume a relatively low pretax annual return of 4% if the 
funds are invested in fixed-income assets for a period of ten 
 
 30. That is, even if a taxpayer could eliminate the second individual level 
of tax, corporate earnings would still be subject to tax at the higher 35% rate, 
as opposed to 21% under the 2017 tax legislation. 
 31. These may include judicial principles such as assignment of income and 
the economic substance doctrine, statutory provisions such as section 269A of 
the Internal Revenue Code (personal services corporations), section 482 (alloca-
tion of income and deduction among taxpayers), section 531 (accumulated earn-
ings tax), and section 542 (personal holding companies), and regulations that 
the IRS may promulgate pursuant to those provisions and the new tax legisla-
tion. 
 32. Michael L. Schler, Reflections on the Pending Tax Cut and Jobs Act, 157 
TAX NOTES 1731, 1733 (2017). For example, the section 541 Personal Holding 
Company penalty may be avoided by combining the corporate investments with 
any business activity with sufficient gross income, even if the business activity 
is not otherwise profitable. See id. 
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years.33 If we were to assume a higher rate of return or a longer 
holding period, some of the tax savings become more substantial. 
The discussion also assumes that any income from investment 
or labor is subject to the tax at the highest marginal rates. 
1. Investing Through a Corporation 
Assume that an individual taxpayer purchases a fixed-in-
come investment, such as a corporate bond that pays an annual 
return of 4%, and the individual is already in the top income tax 
bracket due to their other taxable income for the year. The in-
vestment return would be taxed at the 40.8% rate,34 for an an-
nual after-tax return of 2.37%.35 After ten years, the com-
pounded investment value would grow to approximately 
$1,264.36 
Compare this result to the case where the taxpayer contrib-
utes the $1,000 bond to a corporation, and the investment re-
turns accrues within the corporate solution.37 If the 4% annual 
return is taxed at the 21% corporate tax rate, the investment 
earns an after-tax rate of return of 3.16%.38 After ten years, the 
investment would grow to approximately $1,365.39 If this 
amount is distributed to the taxpayer, they will be taxed on $365 
of net dividend income40 at the 23.8% rate, for an after-tax return 
of approximately $1,278.41 Even with the double tax, the inves-
tor has increased their after-tax return by more than 5%, simply 
by investing through a corporation.42  
Now consider the result if the taxpayer dies at the end of 
Year Ten, while the investment is still held by the corporation, 
and the investor’s heirs receive a stepped-up basis in the corpo-
rate shares.43 The heirs will take a basis in their shares equal to 
 
 33. This example builds on analysis presented by Michael L. Schler. Id. at 
1732–33. 
 34. See supra note 22.  
 35. 4% x (1 – 40.8%). 
 36. $1000 x (1.023710). 
 37. Assume that the corporation has other business activities and will not 
be subject to the personal holding company tax under section 541 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, or the other anti-abuse rules. See supra Part I.A.3.  
 38. 4% x (1 – 21%). 
 39. $1000 x (1.031610). 
 40. I.R.C. § 301(c) (2017). 
 41. $1365 – ($365 x 23.8%). 
 42. That is, the taxpayer realizes $278 in after-tax earnings by investing 
through a corporation, instead of $264 in after-tax earnings by investing directly 
as an individual. ($278 – $264) / $264 = 5.3%.  
 43. I.R.C. § 1014. 
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the fair market value of $1,365, and the entire $365 of income 
entirely escapes the individual layer of tax. In this case the tax-
payer earns a 38% after-tax premium by holding the investment 
in a corporation.44 
A taxpayer can use a similar strategy to reduce the effective 
tax rate on investments in dividend-paying stocks, even though 
the dividends would in any event be taxed at a preferential rate 
to the individual investor.45 This is because dividends paid to the 
corporation would benefit from the 50% (or greater) dividends 
received deduction under the tax legislation.46 As a result, the 
same dividend income, if earned by a corporation would be taxed 
at rate of only 10.5%, rather than the 23.8% top individual rate.  
Of course, a taxpayer could achieve similar results even 
prior to the tax legislation, and without the use of a corporation, 
if the taxpayer simply invested in appreciating assets that do not 
generate current income. By allowing corporations to be used as 
tax shelters, however, the tax legislation dramatically expands 
the availability of this strategy, and the scope of investments 
that could be shielded from the individual layer tax.  
2. Transforming Labor Income into Corporate Profits 
Now consider how the taxpayer earned the $1,000 available 
for the investment. Assume that the taxpayer earns this money 
as labor income, for instance, in the form of compensation for 
services. Here, too, a low corporate tax rate can be used to shield 
a portion of that labor income from tax. Assume, for example, 
that the taxpayer already facing the top marginal individual in-
come tax rate earns an additional $1,000 of labor income. In this 
case, the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate is approximately 40.2%.47 
 
 44. ($365 – $264) / $264 = 38.26%.  
 45. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11). 
 46. Id. § 243. 
 47. This approximate top rate of 40.2% on labor income is slightly lower 
than the 40.8% top individual rate described in the table above in the case of 
ordinary investment income such as interest and rents. The 40.2% rate is com-
prised of several separate taxes. First, the income would be subject to top the 
individual income tax rate of 37%. Id. § 1(a)–(d). It would then also face the 
Medicare surtax and Medicare payroll taxes. The Medicare surtax on employee 
income is under 0.9%. Id. § 3101(b)(2). Medicare payroll taxes are divided be-
tween the employee and employer. The employee-side tax is 1.45%. Id. 
§ 3101(b)(1). The employer-side tax under section 3111(b) is 1.45% as well but, 
because the tax is effectively deductible from other taxes, the maximum effec-
tive cost of the employer-side tax is less than 1.45%. Id. § 3111(b). Most econo-
mists believe that the employer-side payroll tax is effectively borne by labor. See 
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If that income is also taxed at the top ordinary income tax rate, 
the individual will have only $598 available to invest after-tax.48 
If this after-tax amount is invested at the annual 2.37% individ-
ual after-tax rate of return described above, the income will grow 
to only approximately $756 over a ten-year period.49  
If, however, the taxpayer’s income is earned through a cor-
poration, the same $1,000 of income will be taxed at a 21%, leav-
ing $790 available for the corporation to invest.50 At the annual 
3.16% corporate after-tax rate of return described above, the in-
come will grow to approximately $1,078 over a ten year period.51 
If that income is subsequently distributed and subject to a sec-
ond individual layer of tax of 23.8%, the taxpayer will receive 
approximately $821—an approximately 9% after-tax premium 
by using a corporation on the combined return from working and 
from investment.52 The savings are then supercharged if the tax-
payer can entirely eliminate the second individual layer of tax—
through a step up in basis (or through keeping the corporate 
stock in a Roth as described below). In this case, the $1,078 faces 
no additional individual layer of tax, and the taxpayer earned a 
premium of approximately 43%53 by both sheltering their labor 
income and investing the after-tax proceeds through the corpo-
ration.  
 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND FED-
ERAL TAXES 26 (2013). This means that the tax results in lower taxable wages 
(since employers reduce wages to pay the tax). The reduction in wages, however, 
reduces the other taxes owed (including the taxes owed through the employer-
side payroll tax). The net effect is that, if the highest marginal rates are in effect, 
the 1.45% tax rate becomes approximately a 0.9% tax rate, after taking into 
account these interactions. As a result, the 37% top rate, plus the 1.45% em-
ployee-side payroll tax, plus the 0.9% employee Medicare surcharge, plus the 
net employer-side tax of approximately 0.9% yields a total top rate of tax on 
ordinary labor income of approximately 40.2%. The calculation is comparable in 
the case of a self-employed worker under section 1401(b), where the worker is 
responsible for all of the Medicare payroll taxes. I.R.C. § 1401(b). But the em-
ployer-equivalent portion of the tax is similarly deductible from the self-em-
ployed worker’s taxable income. Id. § 164(f ) . 
 48. $1000 – ($1000 x 40.2%). 
 49. $598 x (1.023710). 
 50. A taxpayer may not be able to shield all of their labor income in this 
manner, if the corporation is required to pay reasonable compensation to the 
taxpayer; cf. Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287 (recharacterizing dividends paid 
by an S-corporation to its shareholder as reasonable compensation). In all 
events, the corporation would be able to shield any amount in excess of reason-
able compensation paid by the corporation. 
 51. $790 x (1.031610). 
 52. ($821 – $756) / $756. 
 53. ($1078 – $756) / $756. 
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As these examples demonstrate, taxpayers who can earn 
their labor and investment income through a corporation (and 
have it accrue in the form of corporate profits) will be able to 
shield that income from the higher individual rates.  
3. Gaming by Shareholder-Employees in a Closely Held 
Corporation 
Shareholder-employees in a closely held corporation can 
achieve similar tax benefits by reducing their wages paid out by 
the corporation, and thereby increasing the corporation’s re-
tained profits. In effect, the shareholder-employees can attain 
the benefit of immediately reinvesting their pre-individual-in-
come-tax labor income within the corporation, where it can then 
accrue returns at the lower corporate tax rate. 
The tax advantage in this scenario is generally the same as 
in the above examples. The primary difference in this case is that 
a taxpayer who is both a shareholder and employee of a closely 
held corporation does not need to go through the additional step 
of incorporating in order to shield a portion of their labor income. 
For instance, if a taxpayer were to earn $1,000 of additional sal-
ary from a corporation, this income would be taxed at the ordi-
nary income rate, leaving only $598 available to invest. By con-
trast, if the taxpayer foregoes a portion of her salary in exchange 
for greater retained earnings in the corporation, this amount 
would instead be taxed at the lower corporate tax rate (in the 
form of higher net corporate income). The corporation may then 
invest the after-tax amount of $790, which will similarly accrue 
at the corporation’s higher after-tax rate of investment return—
and with the total amount of savings depending on whether the 
second layer of tax is avoided or not. 
4. Section 962 Election 
Wealthy individuals could also use a foreign corporation to 
nearly halve their tax rate on ordinary income and short-term 
capital gains, and entirely avoid some of the existing anti-abuse 
rules, with an obscure election under section 962.  
Very generally, section 962 allows a “United States share-
holder”54 of a “controlled foreign corporation”55 (a CFC) to elect 
 
 54. A U.S. shareholder is a U.S. person (such as a U.S. resident individual) 
who owns, or is treated as owning, 10% of the voting power or value of a foreign 
corporation. I.R.C. § 951(b) (2017). 
 55. A controlled foreign corporation is a foreign corporation 50% of the vote 
or value owned (or treated as owned) by U.S. shareholders. Id. § 957(a). 
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to be taxable with respect to the Subpart F income (generally 
passive income like interest and capital gains) of his or her CFC 
as if the U.S. shareholder held the CFC through a U.S. corpora-
tion.56 Accordingly, a U.S. shareholder who makes the election is 
taxable at a 21% rate with respect to the undistributed Subpart 
F income of the CFC (the same as if the CFC were owned by a 
U.S. corporation). However, if the CFC makes an actual distri-
bution, the shareholder is subject to an additional tax (i.e., anal-
ogous to dividend income from a C corporation) to the extent of 
79% of the income (i.e., 100% – 21%).57  
Thus, a wealthy individual could form a Cayman Islands 
corporation, contribute cash, and have the Cayman Islands cor-
poration purchase bonds and hold them, or purchase securities 
and actively trade them. Rather than be subject to tax at the 
40.8% individual rate on the interest income and short-term cap-
ital gains,58 the individual would be subject to tax at the 21% 
corporate rate. This strategy is tax-efficient so long as the indi-
vidual does not need distributions from the Cayman Islands cor-
poration, is able to fund the current 21% tax liability from other 
sources, and the Cayman Islands corporation does not earn any 
significant U.S. dividend income.59 
The anti-abuse rules that are intended to prevent individu-
als from indefinitely holding their passive assets in C corpora-
tions60 have no application to a Cayman Islands corporation that 
 
 56. See id. § 962; Treas. Reg. § 1.962-1(a) (1976) (stating that if a section 
962 election is made, the individual is subject to tax in an amount equal to the 
tax which would be imposed under section 11 if the amounts of taxable income 
were received by a domestic corporation). 
 57. The second tax upon an actual dividend is subject to tax at ordinary 
income rates (i.e., 40.8% maximum rate [37% + 3.8%]) unless the dividend is 
qualifying dividend income, in which case it would be taxable at a 23.8% rate. 
Smith v. Commissioner, 151 T.C. No. 5 (2018). 
 58. See supra note 22.  
 59. As mentioned above, dividends from the Cayman Islands corporation 
would be subject to a second tax. See Shaviro, supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. Therefore, to avoid this tax, the individual would not want to receive divi-
dends. This structure is not tax-efficient for portfolios that generate a signifi-
cant amount of U.S.-source dividend income. Undistributed dividend income 
would be subject to a 44.7% effective rate. 44.7% is equal to a 30% U.S. with-
holding tax plus a 21% tax on the remaining 70% of the dividend (after the U.S. 
withholding tax). 
 60. See I.R.C. §§ 269A, 531, 542. 
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is the subject of a section 962 election. The personal holding com-
pany tax does not apply to foreign corporations.61 While the ac-
cumulated earnings tax does apply to foreign corporations,62 for 
purposes of determining accumulated taxable income, amounts 
included under section 951(a) (which includes Subpart F income) 
are allowed as a deduction.63 If the Cayman Islands corporation 
holds only securities, all of its income will be Subpart F income 
that is included under section 951(a). Therefore, the Cayman Is-
lands corporation should not have any accumulated taxable in-
come and should not be subject to the accumulated earnings 
tax.64  
Upon the individual’s death, his or her heirs would receive 
ownership of the Cayman Islands corporation with a stepped-up 
basis.65 The stepped-up basis would enable the heirs to sell their 
interests in the Cayman Islands corporation without tax. A for-
eign buyer could then liquidate the appreciated positions of the 
foreign corporation without U.S. tax.66 Therefore, the foreign 
buyer would be unlikely to significantly discount the purchase 
price. This is a much better result than had the individual held 
his or her portfolio in a U.S. corporation, which would be subject 
to U.S. corporate tax upon a liquidation. 
The bottom line is that holders of debt and traders in secu-
rities have a relatively easy way to nearly halve their taxable 
rate (from 40.8% to 21%) with a Cayman Islands corporation and 
a tax election. This strategy also neatly avoids the anti-abuse 
rules that are designed to prevent individuals from accumulat-
ing earnings in a C corporation. Of course, this strategy is avail-
able only to the wealthiest individuals (who have capital, can af-
ford to set up a Cayman Islands corporation, and can fund tax 
liability without distributions). Although section 962 has been in 
the Code since 1962, it has been only rarely used and there is no 
 
 61. Id. § 542(c)(5).  
 62. See generally id. § 535.  
 63. Id. § 535(b)(10). 
 64. There may be other ways to plan around the anti-abuse rules, but here, 
by statute, they simply do not apply. Furthermore, the passive foreign invest-
ment company (PFIC) rules, another set of anti-deferral rules, do not apply be-
cause the CFC rules trump that regime if both are applicable. Id. § 1297(d). 
 65. Id. § 1014. The stepped-up basis would be equal to fair market value as 
of the date of the individual’s death. 
 66. The heirs would want to sell to a foreign person. Under section 1.962-
3(c) of the Treasury Regulations, if a U.S. person acquires stock of a foreign 
corporation with respect to which a section 962 election has been made, the ac-
quirer is subject to the additional tax described above upon an actual distribu-
tion. Treas. Reg. § 1.962-3 (1965). 
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evidence that Congress appreciated that a reduction in the cor-
porate tax rate could offer an opportunity for high-income indi-
viduals to dramatically reduce their tax rate on interest income 
and short-term capital gains. 
C. REFORM POSSIBILITIES 
For the reasons explained above, gaming opportunities will 
arise whenever the corporate tax rate is set substantially below 
the top individual income tax rate.67 Smaller-scale reforms could 
discourage certain games or limit the potential tax benefits. Yet, 
more fundamental reforms will be needed if the corporate tax 
rate is kept well below the top individual income tax rate. We 
discuss some options for both partial and fundamental reforms 
below.  
1. Partial Reforms 
One simple but effective partial reform would be to elimi-
nate the provision providing for stepped-up basis at death. Elim-
inating this provision would prevent taxpayers from completely 
avoiding the individual layer tax on corporate investments held 
for their entire lifetime.  
This partial solution, however, would still preserve signifi-
cant tax planning opportunities. For instance, this reform would 
not affect strategies based on using Roth retirement accounts or 
other techniques for circumventing the second layer of tax, as 
explained above.  
A number of prior scholarly works advocate repealing the 
stepped-up basis at death.68 The 2017 tax legislation’s reduction 
of the corporate tax rate to well below the top individual income 
 
 67. Others have published related discussions of these issues. See, e.g., 
Shawn Bayern, An Unintended Consequence of Reducing the Corporate Tax 
Rate, 157 TAX NOTES 1137 (2017); Schler, supra note 32; Adam Looney, The 
Next Tax Shelter for Wealthy Americans: C-Corporations, BROOKINGS: UP 
FRONT BLOG (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/11/ 
30/the-next-tax-shelter-for-wealthy-americans-c-corporations. There are also 
formative works on the use of a corporation as a tax shelter. See generally STE-
VEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORPO-
RATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT (2010); Edward D. Kleinbard, Corporate 
Capital and Labor Stuffing in the New Tax Rate Environment (Univ. S. Cal. Ctr. 
L., Econ. & Org., Research Papers Series No. C13-5; Univ. S. Cal. Gould School 
of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 13-5, 2013). 
 68. E.g., Richard Schmalbeck, Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, 
Advocating a Carryover Tax Basis Regime, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109 (2017); 
Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361 (1993). 
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tax rate greatly strengthens the case for and urgency of elimi-
nating (or at least reforming) the stepped-up basis rules.  
Another partial reform would be to limit the tax gaming op-
portunities related to using the dividends-received deduction. 
The 2017 tax legislation reduced the deduction for dividends re-
ceived from an unaffiliated domestic corporation (from 70% to 
50%).69 This change, however, still preserves a low (10.5%) cor-
porate tax rate on dividends received. Further reducing or elim-
inating the deduction for dividends-received from unaffiliated 
domestic corporations would make it less attractive for taxpay-
ers to stuff corporations with dividend-paying equities. Mean-
while, this reform will not interfere with the planning decisions 
of corporations that use affiliated subsidiaries for business pur-
poses. Of course, this reform would only discourage gaming from 
stuffing corporations with dividend paying stocks. Nevertheless, 
combined with reforming or eliminating the stepped-up basis 
rules and other accompanying reforms, this could be an im-
portant element of a basket of partial reforms, and limit the 
scope of investments that a taxpayer would prefer to hold 
through a corporation. 
Finally, Congress and Treasury could strengthen general 
anti-abuse rules in tax law, such as the personal holding com-
pany and accumulated earnings tax provisions.70 However, 
overly restrictive limitations would interfere with corporations’ 
legitimate business decisions as to when and how to deploy cap-
ital. Similarly, limitations on the ability to incorporate for tax 
purposes would require complex rulemaking and line-drawing. 
We are thus doubtful that strengthening anti-abuse rules will 
effectively prevent taxpayers from playing the games described 
in this Part. 
2. Fundamental Reforms 
If Congress remains committed to keeping the corporate tax 
rate well below the top individual income tax rate, more funda-
mental structural changes to the income tax will be needed to 
prevent the gaming opportunities explained above. One option 
would be for corporate earnings to be taxed immediately to the 
individual through either pass-through treatment (for small 
closely held corporations) or through a mark-to-market approach 
(for large publicly traded corporations).71 This change would in 
 
 69. I.R.C. § 243(a)(1).  
 70. Id. §§ 542, 532.  
 71. For elaboration on this reform option, see Eric Toder & Alan D. Viard, 
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turn allow for closing the rate gap between capital and labor in-
come. Further, this package of reforms would neutralize the ben-
efits of investing through corporations and allow for the reduc-
tion or even the elimination of the corporate tax. Other 
fundamental reform options could similarly allow for more con-
sistent treatment of individual and corporate income,72 without 
inviting tax games or disproportionately benefitting wealthy tax-
payers.  
To reduce the benefits of section 962, Congress could provide 
that the personal holding company tax applies to a CFC with 
respect to which a taxpayer has made an election under section 
962 and could deny the deduction from accumulated earnings 
tax for the Subpart F income of a CFC to the extent that the 
income is taxed at the corporate rate by reason of an election 
under section 962.  
While there are multiple ways individuals can use corpora-
tions as a tax shelter, the government may be able to reduce 
these pressures while preserving the lower corporate tax rate 
through future reforms. Of course, sheltering income through a 
corporation may not be the most effective tax planning strategy 
for many taxpayers. This next Part describes alternative oppor-
tunities for tax gaming under the 2017 legislation through the 
new 20% pass-through deduction under section 199A. 
II.  THE FAULTY PASS-THROUGH DEDUCTION   
Perhaps the most notorious change brought by the 2017 tax 
legislation was the newly introduced 20% deduction for certain 
qualified business income. In effect, this deduction reduces the 
top individual income tax rate from about 40.8% to 33.4% for 
those eligible.73 This is a special break for business income not 
 
Replacing Corporate Tax Revenues with a Mark-to-Market Tax on Shareholder 
Income, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 701 (2016). 
 72. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, How to Tax Capital, 70 TAX L. REV. 1 (2016) 
(proposing a flat annual tax on the market value of publicly traded securities); 
Ari Glogower, Taxing Capital Appreciation, 70 TAX L. REV. 111 (2017) (propos-
ing a combined mark-to-market and retrospective taxation system); Edward D. 
Kleinbard, The Right Tax at the Right Time, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 208 (2017) (pro-
posing to tax capital through a “Dual Business Enterprise Income Tax”). 
 73. See Daniel Shaviro, Evaluating the New U.S. Pass-Through Rules, 1 
BRIT. TAX REV. 49, 51 (2018) (“The pass-through rules stand front and centre in 
illustrating both the 2017 Act’s sloppiness and its lack of principle.”). The 20% 
deduction applies only against the top income tax rate of 37% and not the 3.8% 
Medicare surtax. As a result, the top rate on eligible pass-through income is 
([37% x 0.8] + 3.8%), or 33.4%. 
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earned via a corporation, which benefits from the rate cut de-
scribed above. This deduction would make for questionable pol-
icy even if it were well-drafted.74 But, clearly unnecessary gam-
ing opportunities, arbitrary line drawing, and technical 
problems make this new deduction far worse.  
The rules establish a complex framework for determining 
who does and who does not get the deduction. The main con-
straints include: 
First, irrespective of income level, employees are not eligible 
for the deduction on their income,75 and the income must be com-
ing from a trade or business that the person carries on (plus cer-
tain other specified kinds of income).76 There are also other con-
straints that apply to people earning their income in exchange 
for services (even if not employees), though these are probably 
easy to avoid.77 
Second, for those with taxable income above $315,000 for a 
married couple (half that for a single individual), other con-
straints begin to kick in.78 Business income is eligible so long as 
the business has a combination of enough employee wages and 
tangible property.79 However, certain lines of business are ineli-
gible for the deduction. This includes listed professions such as 
 
 74. The best policy justification for the provision is that reducing the effec-
tive marginal tax rate on pass-through businesses reduces the incentives for 
shifting business income into corporate structures, so as to take advantage of 
the new tax benefits using the strategies we explained in Part I. However, a 
number of us consider this to be a rather weak justification for the new deduc-
tion. See Shaviro, supra note 73, at 51 (“[The rules for the new deduction] func-
tion as incoherent and unrationalised industrial policy, directing economic ac-
tivity away from some market sectors and towards others, for no good reason 
and scarcely even an articulated bad one.”). 
 75. I.R.C. § 199A(d)(1)(B). 
 76. Id. § 199A(b)(1).  
 77. See id. § 199A(c)(4). The deduction does not apply to payments to service 
providers if it represents reasonable compensation for services, guaranteed pay-
ments, or payments to partners not acting in their capacity as a partner. The 
last two restrictions are specific to partnerships (and, as it happens, are easy 
for partners working at a partnership to avoid). The first—the restriction mak-
ing “reasonable compensation” ineligible for the deduction—is potentially 
broader and could apply across the board. However, the concept of “reasonable 
compensation” has, up until now, only been used to attack tax avoidance among 
S corporation owners, and, in its proposed regulations, Treasury chose to limit 
the effect to that sector. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-3(b)(2)(i)(H), Fed. Reg. 
40,890, 40,890–97 (Aug. 16, 2018). 
 78. For married couples, the restrictions phase-in over a $100,000 taxable 
income range above the threshold (and half that for a single individual). I.R.C. 
§§ 199A(b)(3), 199(A)(d)(3). 
 79. Id. § 199A(b)(2)(B). 
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performance of services in health, law, athletics, and the per-
forming arts, as well as any trade or business in which the prin-
cipal asset is the reputation or skill of owners or employees.80 
The figure below illustrates the basic application of these 
rules and how different rules apply depending on income level. 
 
 
The rules surrounding the deduction provide tremendous in-
centives for taxpayers to attempt to shoehorn their income into 
the “qualified” category. The heart of the problem is the absence 
of a policy justification for many rules governing the deduction; 
these rules draw formalistic lines favoring some groups and in-
dustries, but not others, some of whom benefit and others who 
do not. These are lines across which taxpayers will play costly 
games.81  
The next sections lay out, first, the kinds of games that tax-
payers will play to qualify for the deduction, and, second, the 
recommended reform to section 199A—namely, its removal from 
the Code.  
 
 80. Specifically, section 199A(d)(2)(A), by way of cross-reference to section 
1202(e)(3)(A), and in combination with section 199A(d)(2)(B), disfavors the fol-
lowing types of services: health, law, accounting, actuarial science, performing 
arts, consulting, athletics, financial services, brokerage services, and also any 
trade or business either “which involves the performance of services that consist 
of investing and investment management, trading, or dealing in securi-
ties . . . partnership interests, or commodities” or “where the principal asset of 
such trade or business is the reputation or skill of 1 or more of its employees.” 
 81. As before, we are grateful to Mike Schler for his many insights on the 
pass-through games. See Schler, supra note 32, at 1734–41. 
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A. TAX GAMES TO QUALIFY FOR THE PASS-THROUGH 
DEDUCTION 
Some favored taxpayers will reap the pass-through deduc-
tion windfall without the need for any games. For them, the only 
game is to be themselves. So, real estate developers, retailers, 
extraction industries like oil and mining, or any independent 
contractor below the income threshold would probably qualify. 
Notably, some professionals, such as architects and engineers, 
were moved in the conference bill from the “disfavored service” 
category to the “favored service” category. As a result, they are 
likely exempted from some of the restrictions placed on other 
service providers, and so presumably can be very highly paid and 
still get a partial or full deduction.82 There is no clear policy ex-
planation for why these services are “favored” services, while 
doctors or those in the performing arts are still in the “disfa-
vored” category—and that lack of policy justification pervades 
the provision as a whole and as it seems likely to be applied. 
Many of the rules governing the new deduction are thus in-
coherent and arbitrary. Gaming opportunities then arise for tax-
payers who do not automatically fall into one of the favored cat-
egories, but who can use various strategies to join the ranks of 
those so favored.  
On August 8, 2018, Treasury issued proposed regulations to 
implement section 199A of the Treasury Regulations.83 Some of 
these regulations are directly aimed at restricting the strategies 
 
 82. The status of engineers and architects under new section 199A, provid-
ing for the 20% deduction, is somewhat murky. The prior House and Senate 
versions of the legislation included (by way of cross-reference to section 
1202(e)(3)) a list of per se specified service trades or businesses whose eligibility 
for the special rate would be limited (Senate version) or eliminated (House ver-
sion). See I.R.C. § 199A. The final legislation removed engineering and architec-
ture from that list (which now include health, law, accounting, actuarial science, 
performing arts, consulting, athletics, financial services, and brokerage ser-
vices). However, the definition of specified service trades or businesses in the 
final legislation still includes (via cross-reference) “any trade or business where 
the principal asset of such trade or business is the reputation or skill of 1 or 
more of its employees.” Id. § 1202(3)(A). If that catch-all phrase were interpreted 
broadly, that would seem to capture most engineering and architecture busi-
nesses, and the removal of engineering and architecture from the list of per se 
specified services would prove to be futile. However, Treasury, in its proposed 
regulations, chose to very narrowly interpret that phrase, and, if that interpre-
tation governs, highly compensated engineers and architects would get access 
to the deduction so long as they have either enough employee wages or tangible 
property. See infra notes 108–12 and accompanying text. 
 83. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-1–A-6, 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884, 40,911–30 (Aug. 
16, 2018).  
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for tax planning that we first identified in our earlier iterations 
of the Games papers. However, even as the regulations targeted 
discrete tax planning maneuvers, they very importantly and ex-
plicitly chose to allow most service providers—who weren’t in the 
discrete, listed categories—to get access to the deduction. This 
left the door open for a number of tax planning maneuvers we 
describe.  
1. Becoming a Non-Employee 
The pass-through deduction is clearly denied to anyone who 
is an employee.84 Yet this potentially remains good news for an-
yone who can quit their job and become either an independent 
contractor (and so be considered a sole proprietor) or a partner 
in a firm. The game is clear: do not be John Doe, employee. Be 
John Doe, independent contractor or partner in an LLC, receiv-
ing a profit share rather than wages.85 
Note that individuals who provide “specified services” (such 
as lawyers and doctors) must have taxable income of less than 
$315,000 for a married couple (or half that for a single individ-
ual) to fully benefit from this game. Notably, taxable income is 
calculated after taking into account other deductions, like the 
standard deduction or itemized deductions. Thus, many well-off 
taxpayers who provide specified services will be under that 
threshold and still qualify for the deduction.86 This gaming tech-
 
 84. See I.R.C. § 199A(d)(1)(B). 
 85. Of course, there are many non-tax-law frictions that will deter many 
taxpayers from becoming non-employees. Our argument here is only that there 
are a good number of taxpayers whose economic situations potentially allow for 
transforming the status of their work from an employee relationship to an in-
dependent contractor or partner relationship and that the new pass-through 
deduction provides these taxpayers with substantial tax motivation for making 
this change. For discussion of some of the relevant non-tax considerations, see 
Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Is New Code Section 199A Really Going to Turn Us 
All into Independent Contractors? (Bos. Coll. Legal Studies Research Paper, 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3101180. 
 86. In our original report, we had described this game as the “Law Firm 
Associates, LLC” loophole. Reuven Avi-Yonah et al., The Games They Will Play: 
Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the House and Senate Tax Bills 
(Dec. 7, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=3084187. Given the new income restrictions, this game prob-
ably will not cover many of the highest paid law firm associates. Nevertheless, 
the income restrictions are not so high as to deny tax benefit to many law firm 
associates and similar taxpayers—who will thus be incentivized to form their 
own separate “Associates, LLC” firms. For instance, median base salary for a 
fourth-year associate in 2017 was $155,000, an income level that would still 
qualify for the pass-through deduction. See Press Release, Sarah Ramirez, Nat’l 
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nique also applies, and without any income limit, to any “fa-
vored” business—like real estate—that is willing to turn an em-
ployee into a junior partner in the business.  
The proposed regulations take limited aim at this particular 
game. Specifically, the regulations try to give the IRS some 
power to stop firms misreporting people as partners or independ-
ent contractors when they actually remain employees for pur-
poses of section 199A based on the multi-factor test that governs 
that distinction.87 The proposed regulations would create a pre-
sumption that someone who switches from being an employee to 
an independent contractor or partner at the same firm actually 
remains an employee. The presumption can be overcome with a 
showing that the economic relationship has in fact changed. Im-
portantly, this presumption does not stop a former employee 
from taking the deduction if the economic relationship really 
does change, for instance changing the amount of direct supervi-
sion or dropping employee benefits (in order to convert someone 
into an independent contractor). Further, the presumption will 
only help to stop misclassification for existing employment rela-
tionships and not new ones. 
The bottom line is that these techniques will cover a wide 
swath of relatively high-income taxpayers who were previously 
employees. Employers already have some incentive to character-
ize workers as independent contractor, and the IRS has faced 
serious challenges enforcing the tax distinction between the 
two.88 This pressure will greatly increase with the added tax 
gaming incentives created by the new pass-through deduction. 
Moreover, for those employees who cannot easily recharacterize 
themselves as independent contractors, similar tax benefits can 
be achieved through the employees becoming partners in the rel-
evant business.89  
 
Ass’n for Law Placement, Associate Salaries Rise in Some Markets, But Na-
tional Median Remains Unchanged (June 1, 2017), https://www.nalp.org/ 
uploads/Research/AssociateSalarySurveyReportPressRelease.pdf. 
 87. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(d), 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884 (Aug. 16, 2018).  
 88. For the basic difficulties in distinguishing between employees and in-
dependent contractors for tax purposes, see David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, 
Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1632 (1999). 
 89. Note that the IRS might try to restrict this game of simply recharacter-
izing employees as independent contractors or as partners by arguing that the 
deduction does not apply to the degree that profits represent “reasonable com-
pensation” for services. But as noted above, Treasury has indicated that it will 
only apply the “reasonable compensation” standard to S corporations, and the 
restrictions on partnerships are relatively easy to plan around. See Prop. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.199A-3(b)(2)(i)(H), 83 Fed. Reg. 40,890, 40,890–94 (Aug. 16, 2018). 
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2. Becoming a Favored Business Through “Cracking” and 
“Packing” 
What if doctors recharacterize themselves as partially 
providing other goods or services like beauty or wellness prod-
ucts? Or, what if lawyers go in-house at a real estate firm? In 
playing these kinds of games, they might be able to at least get 
partial access to the 20% deduction.  
The highest paid doctors and lawyers (and those in other 
professions that are specifically listed) would not be directly eli-
gible for the 20% write off since they are in restricted “specified 
service” industries, which covers certain listed professionals 
above the income threshold.90  
Yet these restricted professionals can potentially still game 
the new pass-through deduction rules through two basic strate-
gies which we will call “cracking” and “packing.”91 That was the 
conclusion we reached in our earlier Games papers.92 The termi-
nology we coined quickly entered the “popular” tax discourse, 
and such planning apparently got underway.93 Treasury seemed 
to agree with us that it could be a significant problem, and, in its 
proposed regulations, tried to deal with some of these strate-
gies—and especially some forms of “cracking”—but certainly not 
all.94 
a. “Cracking” 
The essence of the “cracking” strategy is to separate (“crack 
apart”) the revenue streams from the service partnership, so 
that as much income as possible can qualify for the deduction.  
In the proposed regulations, Treasury tries to shut down a 
specific form of what might be called fake cracking.95 This is 
where owners split apart overhead and support services from a 
 
 90. See Qualified Business Income Deduction, Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.199A, 
1.643, 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884, 40,899 (Aug. 16, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 
pt. 1). 
 91. This terminology borrows from gerrymandering strategies. See Election 
Boundaries: No More Packing or Cracking, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2011, at 49. 
 92. See Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 86, at 25–29 (addressing potential 
“Pass-Through Eligibility Games”). 
 93. E.g., Ruth Simon & Richard Rubin, Crack and Pack: How Companies 
Are Mastering the New Tax Code, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.wsj 
.com/articles/crack-and-pack-how-companies-are-mastering-the-new-tax-code 
-1522768287. 
 94. See Qualified Business Income Deduction, Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.199A, 
1.643, 83 Fed. Reg. at 40,884 (Aug. 16, 2018) (proposing defenses to cracking). 
 95. Id. 
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specific service business, put those in a separate entity all or 
largely owned by the same people, and then try to strip out prof-
its from the specified service business. But, two other forms of 
cracking apparently still work: first, cracking apart lines of “out-
ward facing” business (not overhead and support services), some 
of which are specified services and some of which are not, and 
second, what we call “real cracking” of overhead and support ser-
vices where they are owned by different people. 
The kind of fake cracking strategy addressed by the pro-
posed regulations can be illustrated by the following examples: 
the partners in a law firm set up a separate real estate invest-
ment trust (REIT). The REIT is automatically eligible for the 
pass-through rate, without any requirement that the REIT pay 
W-2 wages or hold sufficient tangible property.96 The REIT 
would hold all of the law firm’s real estate assets. Then, the REIT 
could charge the law firm the maximum rent that could plausi-
bly be justified for use of these assets (based on property valua-
tions) in order to transform some of the law firm’s legal service 
income into rental income earned by the REIT. This rental in-
come would then qualify for the pass-through deduction.97  
For another example, a doctors’ or lawyers’ office could form 
a separate firm which owns ancillary support services like ac-
counting, document management, software, and so on. Similar 
to the REIT strategy above, the game would then be to essen-
tially overcharge the main firm for these ancillary services, so as 
to transform some of the main firm’s revenue into a form that 
qualifies for the pass-through deduction.98  
 
 96. I.R.C. § 199A(b)(1)(B) (2017). However, the REIT strategy would have 
faced the challenge of navigating the related-party rules governing REIT eligi-
bility. That may have been hard to do, especially for firms with few owners. See 
I.R.C. § 856(d)(2)(B) (restricting REIT-treatment when rents are paid by related 
parties). An alternative, avoiding these REIT restrictions, would have been to 
have the real estate simply held by another partnership with the same owners 
as the law firm. In that case, this separate partnership would have needed a 
combination of enough W-2 wages or tangible property to unlock the deduction. 
I.R.C. § 199A(b)(2). In this case, the partnership would have held a significant 
piece of tangible property, the law office itself, helping to unlock the deduction. 
 97. Victor Fleischer first described something like this arrangement on 
Twitter. Victor Fleischer (@vicfleischer), TWITTER (Nov. 2, 2017, 8:48 PM), 
https://twitter.com/vicfleischer/status/926294879998758912. 
 98. Note that, unlike with the REIT version of this strategy, these subsidi-
ary firms would need to pay sufficient W-2 wages or hold enough tangible prop-
erty through the new businesses in order to qualify earnings for the pass-
through deduction. I.R.C. § 199A(b)(2). 
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The proposed regulations try to shut down these fake crack-
ing strategies.99 The regulations require these closely related 
businesses—owning the real estate and support services—to be 
aggregated with the listed service business single even if operat-
ing across different entities.100 That is the case if there is 50% or 
more common ownership.101 
These parts of the proposed regulations seem likely to be up-
held if they are finalized in this form and shut down some of the 
easiest fake cracking strategies. Nonetheless, cracking will re-
main a planning strategy. That is because at least two cracking 
strategies apparently survive. 
First, there is the cracking apart of outward facing busi-
nesses, some of which are specified service businesses and some 
of which are not. By “outward facing,” we mean that the cracked 
businesses provide services or goods to outside consumers, and 
they aren’t just one cracked business providing support services 
to the other. In that case, the activities should be placed in sep-
arate businesses, potentially in different entities that might 
even have the same set of owners.102 There are two key goals for 
the strategy: (1) Do not let the specified services infect the profits 
 
 99. Qualified Business Income Deduction, Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.199A, 
1.643, 83 Fed. Reg. at 40,895–901 (Aug. 16, 2018) (explaining the proposed 
§ 1.199A-5). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A–5(c), 83 Fed. Reg. 40,923, 40,926–27 (Aug. 
16, 2018). There are two aggregation rules applying to businesses with 50% or 
more common owners with a listed service business under the proposed regula-
tions. First, if the cracked business provides 80% or more of its services or prop-
erty to the listed business, the cracked business is simply aggregated entirely 
with the listed business. Although partners of a law firm might own their own 
building via a separate entity, the building is considered to be part of the law 
firm’s trade or business. Second, if the cracked business is under the 80% 
threshold, then the portion of the services or property provided to the listed 
business is considered to be part of the listed business. So, if partners in a law 
firm own a large building and rent out much of it to other businesses, the law 
firm’s rent would be considered to actually be income of the listed business (the 
law firm) for purposes of section 199A. 
 102. It is actually ambiguous what it takes to effectively “crack” businesses 
under section 199A and get them treated as separate businesses for these pur-
poses.  The proposed regulations suggest that the definition of trade or business 
is the same as under section 162, but that provides little guidance. Prop. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.199A-1(b)(13), 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884, 40,911 (Aug. 16, 2018). At one point, 
in the preamble to the proposed regulations, Treasury suggests that running 
the businesses in separate entities should normally suffice to crack a business, 
and so that might be the safest route for taxpayers. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-
4, 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884, 40,894 (Aug. 16, 2018) (“[I]n most cases, a trade or busi-
ness cannot be conducted through more than one entity.”). 
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made from other activity so that those other profits remain eli-
gible for section 199A. (2) If the two businesses share items like 
overhead costs, try to attribute as much of the profits to the eli-
gible business as possible by assigning as much of the shared 
costs to the specified service business as owners can. The IRS of 
course may try to prevent such shifting of expenses (and thus 
profits). However, these kinds of games among related parties 
are difficult to police as it requires the IRS to try to identify the 
“right” way to share expenses—such as the right amount of 
wages of common employees to attribute to one business versus 
the other.103 
Second, real cracking of overhead and support services—
where the businesses do not have common ownership—could 
still reduce tax bills. Specifically, law firms and other listed busi-
nesses that now do not own their own buildings or provide their 
own support services will be at an advantage under section 
199A. That is because, if the building or support services are re-
ally owned by others, those other owners can take the section 
199A deduction on their streams of income (despite providing 
real estate and support to the listed business), and the tax sav-
ings can be split among all of the relevant parties. So, in these 
cases, fake cracking is out; real cracking is in. 
b. “Packing” 
The other strategy for becoming a favored business—“pack-
ing”—is to add (“pack”) other qualifying business activities into 
the service partnership, transforming the combined entity into 
one that is not primarily providing disfavored services.104  
The proposed regulations address this strategy too, to a lim-
ited degree. Namely, the regulations provide a de minimis rule 
indicating that, if only a very small share of the receipts are from 
listed services, then the business is out from the restriction.105 
 
 103. The proposed regulations only seem to restrict this cracking strategy to 
the degree that the non-listed outward facing services are considered “inci-
dental” to the specified trade or business. The proposed regulations define an 
incidental non-listed business as one meeting the following criteria: 50% or 
more common ownership with a listed service business; shared expenses with 
that specified service business; and gross revenues that are 5% or less of the 
combined revenues of the listed service business and the non-listed one. If the 
non-listed business is incidental, then the deduction isn’t available for it. Thus, 
cracking apparently works so long as the non-listed activity is large enough rel-
ative to the listed activity to cross the 5% of revenue threshold. See Prop. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.199A-5(c)(3), 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884, 40,926 (Aug. 16, 2018). 
 104. Thanks to Adam Looney for pointing out this strategy. 
 105. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(c)(1), 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884, 40,926 (Aug. 16, 
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The proposed rules say that, if less than 5% of gross receipts for 
large firms (and 10% for small firms) are due to the listed ser-
vices, the entire trade or business gets the deduction.106  
At first blush, it might appear that, under the proposed reg-
ulations, stuffing has no role to play. After all, it would require 
a lot of stuffing to reduce listed activity to less than 5% of a firm’s 
gross receipts. Further, businesses would not want to risk cross-
ing that threshold since, in that case, the listed service business 
appears to infect everything else in that trade or business.  
But, some easy strategies seem to survive. For instance, let 
us say a lawyer goes in-house at a real estate firm, packing her 
“bad” services into a “good” trade or business. It’s not even clear 
that the services she provides within the firm count toward the 
5% threshold of gross receipts or how that would be measured. 
She might—and probably does—get the full deduction, and it 
seems unlikely that the IRS would try to argue that in-house 
counsel could lead to infection of all the business’s activities.  
3. Not Being in One of the Listed Categories  
Perhaps most obviously, one way to get access to the deduc-
tion is for high-income service providers to try to define their ac-
tivity as not being listed. For those clearly covered by the listed 
categories (a lawyer at a law firm, a surgeon, and so on), this will 
not work, but, for others at the borderline (and there might be a 
surprising number of people at those borders), there is substan-
tial incentive to try to get outside the listed categories. 
Here, the proposed regulations aggravated problems rather 
than the opposite. For those above the income threshold, section 
199A lists certain professions that don’t get the deduction 
(health, law, etc.), and then includes a catch all category of any 
business in which the principal asset is the reputation or skill of 
the owners or employees.107 If Treasury had read that catchall 
broadly, then the catchall could not be easily avoided by high-
income service providers, and there would be far less pressure 
on exactly how the other listed professions get defined.  
a. Gaming “Reputation or Skill” 
In earlier iterations of Games, we suggested that the “repu-
tation or skill” catchall could be gameable—avoided through a 
 
2018). 
 106. Id.  
 107. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(a)(2)–(3), 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884, 40,923–26 
(Aug. 16, 2018). 
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“packing”-style strategy, combining activities and property to-
gether with reputation or skill.108 Unlike in some other areas, 
Treasury in the proposed regulations did not address our con-
cerns, and, instead, defined “reputation or skill” very nar-
rowly.109 If these regulations are finalized, this catchall will in 
fact catch very little, and the well-advised should be able to often 
escape. 
The proposed regulations limit this catch-all to three situa-
tions: (1) income from product endorsements; (2) licensing fees 
for use of one’s image, name, and so on; and (3) fees for appear-
ances at events, on radio, on television, or through other media 
formats.110 Those three situations of course do not cover many 
types of activities in which high income service providers are 
earning large returns based on reputation or skill. Instead, put-
ting to the side the third limited category of appearance fees, this 
is focused only on the sale of reputation and reputation alone. 
So, how can taxpayers avoid the catchall under the proposed 
regulations? Pack reputation with other activities. Consider, for 
example, an actor or actress with a generally positive reputation 
who uses that reputation to sell products. She should not license 
her name to a firm to take the deduction; that would get caught. 
Instead, she should mix that reputation with some labor. For in-
stance, consider Gwyneth Paltrow’s “lifestyle brand” business—
Goop—which sells products like face creams.111 A business like 
this (if it were not incorporated, as is the case with Goop) would 
presumably qualify for the pass-through deduction, notwith-
standing the centrality of the owner’s reputation.  
In fact, the proposed Treasury regulations explicitly suggest 
that a famous chef would get the 20% deduction on the income 
from the restaurants she owns.112 And, that is despite the fact 
that presumably the returns from those restaurants are, in sig-
nificant part, a return to her reputation or skill. The chef simply 
would not get the deduction on licensing fees she receives from 
product endorsements, which means (for purposes of section 
 
 108. See Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 86, at 23–24 (“Once the business oper-
ations are packed together, it would be difficult for the IRS to argue that repu-
tation is still the principal asset of the combined business.”). 
 109. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(b)(2)(xiv), 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884, 40,925 
(Aug. 16, 2018). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See GOOP, https://goop.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2018). 
 112. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(b)(3) Ex. 8, 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884, 40,926 
(Aug. 16, 2018). 
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199A) she should be involved in the actual creation of those prod-
ucts—in which case, deduction. 
Now, how about a certain real-estate mogul and reality TV 
star? Well, it depends. Under the proposed regulations, the li-
censing arrangements apparently do not get the deduction, but 
other activities, if combined with other investments and maybe 
the family’s labor, seem to benefit. Trump Hotel, partly owned 
by the Trumps and run by them, gets in apparently.  
b. Gaming the Other Listed Categories 
With the “reputation or skill” catchall so easy to avoid, large 
tax differences ride on whether a high-income service provider 
falls into the other listed categories. And there is certain to be 
substantial litigation and planning on this front. 
Take one seemingly simple category: that of health services. 
The proposed regulations further define those services as fol-
lows—“the provision of medical services by individuals such as 
physicians, pharmacists, nurses, dentists, veterinarians, physi-
cal therapists, psychologists and other similar healthcare profes-
sionals performing services in their capacity as such who provide 
medical services directly to a patient (service recipient).”113 
There is then a key question: Is a medical professional only 
providing a listed service if providing “services directly to a pa-
tient”?114 The actual meaning of the regulation here is somewhat 
ambiguous. That phrase might only modify the catchall category 
of “other similar healthcare professionals” or it might modify the 
entire list and apply to everyone.  
Let us say that the modifier applies to everyone and this is 
suggesting that those in health care fields—like medical re-
searchers—who do not provide direct services are not included. 
Then, it is not just medical researchers who could get the deduc-
tion. It is doctors who do not directly see patients. Like 
pathologists. Or many radiologists. And they should make sure 
not to see patients in order to maintain their eligibility. 
It is possible that Treasury addresses some of these issues 
in its final regulations and makes sure that the likes of 
pathologists and radiologists don’t get the deduction. But, this 
same kind of trouble exists with many of the listed categories 
 
 113. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(b)(2)(ii), 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884, 40,924 (Aug. 
16, 2018). 
 114. Id. 
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and their definitions. What is “consulting” (also a listed ser-
vice)?115 The proposed regulations answer that age-old question 
by defining consulting as “provision of professional advice and 
counsel to clients to assist the client in achieving goals and solv-
ing problems.”116 That definition could seem to potentially apply 
to almost every service provider or to very few, and, in the mas-
sive gray area, there will surely be many who gamble the IRS 
won’t challenge them and then litigation with those relative few 
that the IRS disputes.  
4. Unprofitably Stuffing Property into the Business 
In order to fully benefit from the pass-through deduction 
and even if the line of business restrictions is avoided, the rele-
vant business must either pay sufficient W-2 wages or else own 
sufficient tangible depreciable property.117 For businesses that 
do not already meet one of these tests, the obvious game is to 
seek to obtain more tangible depreciable property. 
However, if obtaining more property would be profitable for 
the business absent tax motivations, then presumably the busi-
ness would have already done so even without the new tax in-
centives created by the pass-through deduction rules. Thus, the 
concern here is that the pass-through deduction rules incentivize 
taxpayers to effectively burn money in order to unprofitably ob-
tain more tangible depreciable property that would otherwise 
function better in another business.  
For example,118 assume that a pass-through business has no 
employees, and therefore no W-2 wages. Further assume that 
the business buys a debt-financed asset for $10,000, with zero 
cash out of pocket. Finally assume that the asset earns a six per-
cent rate of return, but that the business pays 7% annual inter-
est on the debt.  
Absent tax considerations, this would be a net money loser. 
This is because the interest payment exceeds the rate of return, 
generating a 1% or $100 net economic loss. Under the new pass-
 
 115. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(b)(2)(vi), 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884, 40,924 (Aug. 
16, 2018). 
 116. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(b)(2)(vii), 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884, 40,924 (Aug. 
16, 2018). 
 117. I.R.C § 199A(b)(2) (2017). 
 118. This example builds on analysis in a prior blog post written by one of 
us (Shaviro). See Daniel Shaviro, Under the New Tax Bill, Lose Money Before 




2019] THE GAMES THEY WILL PLAY 1473 
 
through deduction rules, however, the business can apply 2.5% 
of the cost of new asset ($250) towards increasing the pass-
through deduction,119 thereby reducing the business’s taxable in-
come by $350 per year (when added to the net $100 interest ex-
pense). At a 37% tax rate, this deduction would thus reduce the 
taxpayer’s final tax liability by approximately $130, which is 
more than the $100 economic loss from the money-losing invest-
ment.  
As this example demonstrates, the new pass-through deduc-
tion rules will incentivize some taxpayers to effectively burn eco-
nomic resources in order to make unprofitable investments in 
order to qualify for the pass-through deduction.  
Furthermore, taxpayers will also be incentivized to obtain 
legal ownership of tangible depreciable property without obtain-
ing meaningful economic ownership. For instance, a taxpayer 
could purchase tangible depreciable property owned by another 
party, then lease that property back to the original party with 
the terms written so that the original party maintains effective 
economic ownership, but with legal ownership transferring so as 
to enable the taxpayer to qualify for the pass-through deduction.  
Sale and leaseback transactions of this sort have long been 
used as a tool for tax gaming.120 Yet the rules governing the new 
pass-through deduction create further incentives for taxpayers 
to engage in these sorts of transactions.  
Overall, we should expect for some taxpayers to burn eco-
nomic resources in order to purchase property, and for more 
widespread tax gaming whereby taxpayers obtain legal owner-
ship of property without economic ownership, with the result be-
ing magnified social costs from distortionary tax gaming. 
B. REFORM POSSIBILITIES 
The fundamental issue underlying all of the technical prob-
lems we explain in this Part is the lack of underlying logic in 
deciding who can benefit from the pass-through deduction and 
who cannot. Independent contractors and partners can benefit, 
but not employees. Why? An owner of real estate through a REIT 
can benefit, but not the doctor in the building. Why? An architect 
can benefit in some ways that a lawyer cannot. Why? And so on.  
 
 119. I.R.C. § 199A(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 120. E.g., JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ch. 8 (17th 
ed. 2017); MICHAEL A. LIVINGSTON & DAVID S. GAMAGE, TAXATION: LAW, PLAN-
NING, AND POLICY 502–20 (2d ed. 2010). 
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For each of these formalistic and seemingly arbitrary dis-
tinctions, there is a game to be played to fall within the favored 
category. Treasury should limit these games to the extent possi-
ble, so as to staunch the bleed in revenue, and it has made an 
attempt with the proposed regulations. However, the IRS will 
face an uphill battle in combatting these games due to the inco-
herent nature of the statutory provision, and the narrow way in 
which it is so far defining an important restriction on the deduc-
tion for high-income service providers.  
Given this provision’s regressivity, expense, and complexity, 
the best reform solution would be to simply eliminate the pass-
through deduction. 
III.  STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE SALT 
DEDUCTION CAP   
One of the most controversial changes brought by the 2017 
tax legislation is the new cap on the deduction for state and local 
tax (SALT) payments under section 164 of the Internal Revenue 
Code. This new cap limits individual taxpayers to claiming no 
more than $10,000 in SALT deductions for tax years 2018 
through 2025, but permits a combination of taxes in order to 
reach that cap.121 For example, a taxpayer could deduct both 
property and income taxes up to this combined amount.  
Some taxpayers will now find themselves at or below the cap 
and thus not directly affected by the partial repeal of the SALT 
deduction. In many parts of the country, however, millions of 
taxpayers regularly pay state and local taxes well in excess of 
the $10,000 cap.122 Furthermore, many of those taxpayers will 
see a net tax increase under the new law.123 This is why the par-
 
 121. I.R.C. § 164(b)(6)(B). The tax legislation also significantly increases the 
standard deduction, which will also reduce the number of taxpayers taking the 
SALT deduction. Id. § 63(c)(7). 
 122. Tracy Gordon, The Price We Pay for Capping the SALT Deduction, TAX 
POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Feb. 15, 2018), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/ 
price-we-pay-capping-salt-deduction (providing map of states with average 
SALT deduction over $10,000). 
 123. See, e.g., CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON SPECIFIC 
PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 12 (2018), https://www 
.ftb.ca.gov/law/legis/Federal-Tax-Changes/CAPreliminaryReport3Provisions 
-Revise.pdf (estimating that approximately 1,000,000 California taxpayers will 
be impacted by the SALT cap and will end up paying more than $100 overall in 
increased taxes as a result of the new tax law).  
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tial repeal of the SALT deduction was projected to be a very sig-
nificant revenue raiser, something on the order of $500 billion 
over the budget window.124  
In this Part, we argue that it was incorrect to estimate that 
such a large amount of revenue could be raised from a slice of 
taxpayers in just a few states because those states’ governments 
could and would respond by adjusting their tax systems. 
Some additional clarifications are helpful before we survey 
some possible state government responses. First, it is worth not-
ing that state government responses to the SALT deduction re-
peal are to some extent a different category of concern as com-
pared to gaming by individual and business taxpayers. One 
reason for this is because, at least to some extent, our tax system 
is based on the expectation that different states will compete 
with one another through tax policy design for the benefit of each 
state’s citizens. Indeed, on a broader level, inter-jurisdictional 
tax competition is one of the primary justifications for many of 
the business tax law changes the tax legislation enacts; the idea 
there being that the United States is trying to improve its com-
petitive position as compared to other nations by means of tax 
reform. Thus, state governments have a different relationship 
with the federal government than do individual and business 
taxpayers. This different relationship arguably makes potential 
state government responses to the tax legislation different in 
kind from gaming responses by individual and business taxpay-
ers. 
Moreover, there is another, related reason why state govern-
ment responses are arguably in a different category from other 
forms of gaming. This is because the size and nature of the par-
tial repeal of the SALT deduction placed an enormous new bur-
den on state governments that are trying to fund their public 
spending with progressive taxes.125 Furthermore, these same 
state governments that are disproportionately burdened by the 
tax legislation are generally also trying to fund more social ser-
vices than are many other states’ governments.126 Given that the 
highest marginal individual income tax rate pre-2018 was 
39.6%, the SALT deduction repeal in effect raised the tax price 
of progressive state income taxes by almost 40% for taxpayers in 
the highest tax bracket—a huge change. This shock could have 
 
 124. COMM. OF CONFERENCE, 115TH CONG., JOINT EXPLANATORY STATE-
MENT OF THE COMM. OF CONFERENCE app. at 2 (2017). 
 125. See generally Hemel, supra note 9. 
 126. See Gordon, supra note 122. 
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been mitigated by a phase-in or by pairing this increase in tax 
price with additional federal funding for, say Medicaid, or 
through some other form of federal government support for 
state-level finances. Yet no such measures were enacted, and 
there is a reasonable expectation that the federal government 
will instead attempt to shift even more financial burdens onto 
state governments.127 Accordingly, even for those who believe in 
the abstract that state governments ought not to tax income at 
progressive rates, one might still agree on federalism grounds 
that a state would have sound reasons to act so that its preferred 
tax policy—progressive income tax rates—can be sustained in 
the face of a sudden shift in federal policy.128  
Regardless, whatever the justification for state government 
responses and whether or not one might agree or disagree with 
these justifications,129 our primary analytical point is that states 
have several plausible avenues to mitigate the large and sudden 
change created by the SALT deduction repeal, and there was and 
is every reason to expect state governments to take such actions.  
In this regard, the SALT deduction repeal is very similar to 
other aspects of the tax legislation that we have highlighted. 
Just as the tax legislation’s legislative process did not suffi-
ciently take into account the likely consequences of taxpayer re-
sponses to other changes (like dramatically reducing the corpo-
rate tax rate), the legislative process also did not sufficiently 
take into account how state governments are likely to respond to 
the partial repeal of the SALT deduction. 
 
 127. For example, California estimated that it stood to lose over $100 billion 
in federal funding under the Senate Obamacare repeal bill. Memorandum from 
the Cal. Dep’t Health Care Servs. to Diana S. Dooley, Sec’y, Cal. Health & Hu-
man Servs. (June 27, 2017), http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/Documents/BCRA_Impact_ 
Memo_062717.pdf. 
 128. Of course, this is also assuming that wealthier taxpayers respond to tax 
rates. Even if one is inclined to believe that the response of wealthy taxpayers 
has thus far been more muted than anecdotally reported, there would still be 
good reason for states to avoid conducting such a high stakes natural experi-
ment. For a conservative estimate of the responsiveness of the wealthy to tax 
rates, see Cristobal Young et al., Millionaire Migration and Taxation of the 
Elite: Evidence from Administrative Data, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 421 (2016). 
 129. For critiques see, for example, Leonard E. Burman & Frank Sammar-
tino, State Responses to the TCJA’s SALT Deduction Limit May Be Costly and 
Favor High-Income Residents, TAX POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Jan. 30, 2018), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/state-responses-tcjas-salt-deduction 
-limit-may-be-costly-and-favor-high-income-residents; Jared Walczak, State 
Strategies to Preserve SALT Deductions for High-Income Taxpayers: Will They 
Work?, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 5, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/state-strategies 
-preserve-state-and-local-tax-deduction. 
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At the time of this writing, there remains considerable un-
certainty about what actions state governments will actually 
take and about how the IRS, Treasury, and courts might re-
spond. However, each of the expedients outlined below has al-
ready been enacted into law by at least one state and all of these 
expedients are in active consideration by other state govern-
ments. 
All three expedients look to continue to fund state and local 
governments using dollars that are still deductible at the federal 
level. The first expedient discussed, in Section A, will be the in-
creased use of charitable deductions because the new tax law did 
not change the rules governing charitable donations to govern-
ments. Section B will discuss states shifting to the greater use of 
a payroll tax imposed on an employer; the new tax law did not 
change the rules governing the deductibility of taxes imposed on 
a business. Section C will consider shifting to a different kind of 
tax imposed on business entities; such taxes also remain deduct-
ible. Finally, in Section D, we briefly consider other more 
thoughtful approaches to reforming the SALT deduction. 
A. INCREASED USE OF CHARITABLE GIFTS 
The tax legislation did not change the prior tax law provi-
sions allowing taxpayers who itemize to deduct charitable con-
tributions, including for charitable contributions to state and lo-
cal governments.130 The tax legislation also did not address the 
broad ways that federal tax law has treated charitable donations 
to governments, which has been to ignore the state and local tax 
consequences in valuing a charitable gift for purposes of the fed-
eral-level deduction.131 Even when the highest marginal tax rate 
was 91%, in 1963,132 federal tax law did not reduce the value of 
an individual’s federal deduction for charitable contributions on 
 
 130. I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) (2017). 
 131. The analysis in Part III.A overlaps substantially with analysis from two 
other essays. Joseph Bankman et al., Caveat IRS: Problems With Abandoning 
the Full Deduction Rule, 88 ST. TAX NOTES 547 (2018); Joseph Bankman et al., 
State Responses to Federal Tax Reform: Charitable Tax Credits, 83 ST. TAX 
NOTES 433 (2018) [hereinafter State Responses]. Four of the authors of this ar-
ticle are also co-authors of those (contemporaneously written) essays, which 
elaborate on much of the analysis in Part III.A in greater depth than we can 
here. 
 132. Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 
22, 2017), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-highest-marginal 
-income-tax-rates. 
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account of federal or state-level tax benefits received from mak-
ing charitable contributions. 
Moreover, this principle—which has been called the “full de-
duction rule”—has also been applied in reference to state-level 
tax credits offered to subsidize taxpayers for making certain 
kinds of desired donations.133 These state-level tax credits have 
been quite generous in some cases, sometimes as high as 
100%.134 Relying on longstanding precedents governing the 
treatment of charitable deductions, both courts and the IRS have 
consistently applied the full deduction rule to these state-level 
tax credits. This means that even for taxpayers receiving a 100% 
state-level tax credit, federal tax law has not reduced the value 
of the federal-level charitable contribution deduction allowed on 
account of that state-level tax benefit. 
Consequently, for state-level tax credits of somewhat less 
than 100%, taxpayers may achieve more than a dollar of com-
bined state and federal tax savings for each dollar contributed. 
Note here that a 90% (or lower) credit would still enable par-
ticipants to come out ahead after tax for making a qualifying do-
nation. If a taxpayer in the new 24% federal income tax bracket 
were to make a $100 qualifying charitable contribution through 
such a program, he would save $90 of state-level taxes and $24 
of federal level taxes. The full after-tax return would thus be 
$114 of combined tax savings from the $100 contribution. 
Thus, by offering more expansive state-level charitable con-
tribution credits for donations to state governments or to state-
government sponsored programs, state governments can effec-
tively facilitate taxpayers transforming (potentially federally 
non-deductible) state tax payments into (federally deductible) 
charitable contributions. 
We are aware of over 100 programs in thirty states that al-
ready had generous credits of this type in place prior to the pas-
sage of the new tax legislation.135 Furthermore, prior to the re-
cent partial cap on the SALT deduction enacted by the new tax 
legislation, millions of taxpayers who had been subject to the fed-
eral Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) were in a situation where 
they lost their SALT deductions as a result of being subject to 
 
 133. State Responses, supra note 131 (detailing how the “full deduction” rule 
can be used by taxpayers). 
 134. Id. at 433. 
 135. Id.  
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the AMT.136 These taxpayers nevertheless retained their eligi-
bility for federal charitable contribution deductions made as part 
of these generous state-level credit programs.  
In other words, even prior to the new tax legislation, the 
combination of the previously existing state-level credit pro-
grams and the limits on federal SALT deductions due to the AMT 
meant that a good number of taxpayers could effectively trans-
form at least portions of their (non-federally deductible on ac-
count of the AMT) state tax liabilities into (fully federally de-
ductible) charitable contributions. 
The more stringent limitations on SALT deductions enacted 
through the tax legislation thus put more—or somewhat differ-
ent—taxpayers into an equivalent situation that had already 
been faced by many taxpayers subject to the AMT.137 Conse-
quently, we predicted that state governments would explore ex-
panding their use of state-level tax credits for charitable contri-
butions to particular activities, facilitating a greater number of 
taxpayers taking advantage of the opportunity that federal tax 
law has allowed for transforming (non-federally deductible) state 
tax liabilities into (federally deductible) charitable contribu-
tions. 
Indeed, perhaps because this basic structure for using tax 
credits to mitigate the tax legislation’s partial denial of SALT 
deductibility was already widespread prior to the tax legislation, 
this has been the strategy for state responses that has drawn the 
most attention of state legislators and commentators.138 For in-
stance, New York passed a law that provides an 85% credit for 
 
 136. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2017); Frank Sammartino, The Complex Rela-
tionship Between the State and Local Tax Deduction and the Alternative Mini-
mum Tax, TAXVOX: TAX POL’Y CTR. (June 19, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycent 
er.org/taxvox/complex-relationship-between-state-and-local-tax-deduction-and 
-alternative-minimum-tax.  
 137. The IRS proposed regulations report that about 5% of taxpayers are 
expected to be itemizers with state and local taxes over the SALT cap. Contri-
butions in Exchange for State or Local Tax Credits, Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.164(b)(6), 83 Fed. Reg. 43,563, 43,569 (Aug. 27, 2018) (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. pt. 1). The Tax Policy Center reported that about 5% of taxpayers were 
subject to the AMT in 2017. T17-0149: Characteristics of Alternative Minimum 
Tax (AMT) Payers, 2016 - 2018 and 2027, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 28, 2017), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/baseline-alternative 
-minimum-tax-amt-tables-april-2017/t17-0149-characteristics. Thus, the tax 
legislation might not have even placed many more taxpayers into the position 
of having a capped (or zero) deduction for state and local taxes. 
 138. E.g., Contributions in Exchange for State or Local Tax Credits, Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.164(b)(6), 83 Fed. Reg. 40,884, 43,563 (Aug. 16, 2018); Walczak, 
supra note 129. 
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donations to one of two charitable funds.139 At the time of this 
writing, California is considering two such laws. One of these 
proposals would, in effect, permit an 80% credit for a donation to 
almost any 501(c)(3).140 
It is currently too early to foretell the fate of these efforts. It 
remains to be seen to what extent these new programs might 
survive possible efforts by Treasury or the IRS to restrict 
them.141 On August 27th, the Treasury Department and the IRS 
promulgated proposed regulations targeting state-credit pro-
grams in particular.142 The upshot of these regulations is that 
the IRS will henceforth reduce the value of a charitable donation 
at the federal level by the value of state-level credits if those 
credits exceed 15%. Such a rule forecloses using charitable dona-
tions as a SALT workaround, but has no impact on the other two 
workaround strategies we discuss. At the time of this writing, 
the future of these regulations is unknown. If the regulations are 
finalized as written, we think they will be hard to challenge, 
though they are hardly unassailable.143  
Yet there is also a reasonable chance the regulations will be 
changed in a way that makes them more susceptible to chal-
lenge. Powerful parties have urged the IRS to carve out excep-
tions for at least some of the credit programs that pre-existed the 
TCJA.144 There are various ways the carve outs could be done, 
including relying on some form of the public/private distinc-
tion.145 If the final regulations move from a relatively principled 
position about all state-level credits, we would expect challenges 
to the regulations to be more powerful. 
 
 139. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 92-GG.4; N.Y. TAX LAW § 606(iii) (Consol. 2018). 
 140. Assemb. B. 2217, 2017–18 Leg. (Cal. 2018). 
 141. For further discussion, see David Gamage, Charitable Contributions in 
Lieu of SALT Deductions, 87 ST. TAX NOTES 973, 974–75 (2018) (discussing 
whether Treasury has the authority to revise this aspect of federal tax law with-
out legislation). 
 142. See Contributions in Exchange for State or Local Tax Credits, 83 Fed. 
Reg. at 43,563. 
 143. See, e.g., Daniel Hemel, Pounding SALT?, MEDIUM: WHATEVER 
SOURCE DERIVED (Aug. 27, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source 
-derived/pounding-salt-f37b5e22def4. 
 144. Amy Hamilton, IRS Has Plan to Shut Down SALT Workarounds, TAX 
PRAC. EXPERT, at 21 (2018) (“[Kevin] Brady . . . encouraged states with pre-
TCJA tax credit programs in place to review the proposed regulations ‘and make 
full use of the comment period.’”); The Editorial Bd., Blue State ‘Charity’, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blue-state-charity-1534546 
826. 
 145. See, e.g., Amandeep Grewal, The Charitable Contribution Strategy: An 
Ineffective SALT Substitute, 38 VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
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In any event, we highlight the credit response by state gov-
ernments not because we view this response as ideal or impervi-
ous to regulatory action, but instead to note that the arguments 
these responses rely upon are substantial and are thus an exam-
ple of a possible game (or perhaps glitch) that could have—and 
should have—been considered as part of the legislative process 
leading up to the tax legislation. Indeed, the current legal uncer-
tainty surrounding the fate of these programs is in itself another 
harm caused by the rushed process of drafting and passing the 
tax legislation. 
B. INCREASED USE OF PAYROLL TAXES 
A fundamental rule of tax administration is that tax law fol-
lows legal incidence, not economic incidence.146 The legal inci-
dence of a payroll tax falls on an employer to the extent that the 
employer has payroll.147 By contrast, the consensus among econ-
omists is that a large portion of the payroll taxes currently levied 
are actually paid by employees—that is, the economic incidence 
is different from the legal incidence.148  
Taxes imposed on employers as an ordinary and necessary 
business expense remain deductible following the tax legisla-
tion.149 This asymmetry thus suggests another strategy for state 
government responses: shifting from income taxes to payroll 
taxes.150  
States already have payroll levies in place for unemploy-
ment taxes. All that would be required to implement this re-
sponse is for a state government to legislate an increase in its 
payroll tax levies accompanied by either roughly offsetting de-
creases to its income tax levies or else the provision of income 
tax credits to offset the new payroll tax levies. 
 
 146. See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 341 (1996) (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s reluctance to look through legal incidence to economic in-
cidence). 
 147. Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Incidence, in 4 HANDBOOK OF 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1787, 1789 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 
2002). 
 148. Id. at 1821–22. 
 149. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2017). 
 150. For earlier discussion of this strategy by one of us, see Daniel Hemel, 
State Payroll Tax Shift Stands on Solid Legal Ground, MEDIUM: WHATEVER 
SOURCE DERIVED (Jan. 5, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source 
-derived/state-payroll-tax-shift-stands-on-solid-legal-ground-fe769d8ab309. 
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Of course, there are a host of administrative concerns re-
lated to implementing such a response.151 Among these, the 
structure of this response requires that employees bear the tax 
through decreased (after-payroll-tax) salaries.152 The employees 
are then made whole by the reduction in their income tax liabil-
ities. But will salaries actually adjust? In some cases, full and 
immediate adjustment might not happen because of locked-in 
contract terms.  
Another administrative concern is that payroll taxes are a 
flat levy and so maintaining the overall state tax system’s pro-
gressivity following the implementation of this response can be 
complicated. Further, many taxpayers who itemize earn signifi-
cant income from sources other than salary and thus a payroll 
tax shift does not mitigate the SALT cap as to taxes on that in-
come.153 
Yet, these administrative concerns do not appear to be in-
surmountable. For instance, New York has enacted a program of 
this sort while making the program elective and only for employ-
ees with higher salaries.154  
Notably, in addition to being a response to the new cap on 
federal SALT deductions, payroll tax has other (controversial) 
policy justifications. On the negative side of the ledger, payroll 
taxes are regressive and impose a tax on an activity we generally 
want employers to do more of (paying wages), which are two big 
strikes against payroll taxes. Yet payroll taxes provide a broad 
and stable tax base that one can use to finance social welfare 
programs, which is currently done in the United States and in 
other jurisdictions all over the world.155 Thus, although this pol-
icy expedient is primarily reactive, it is important to keep in 
mind that the payroll tax response strategy has its own arguably 
positive justifications. 
 
 151. For discussion, see Brian Galle, State SALT Fixes, Part III: Payroll Tax 
& Credit, MEDIUM: WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED (Jan. 4, 2018), https:// 
medium.com/whatever-source-derived/state-salt-fixes-part-iii-payroll-taxcredit 
-c2031d7b3caa. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 850–57 (Consol. 2018). 
 155. See generally KYLE POMERLAU, TAX FOUND., FISCAL FACT NO. 434, A 
COMPARISON OF THE TAX BURDEN ON LABOR IN THE OECD (2014) (comparing 
payroll taxes worldwide). 
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C. INCREASED TAXATION OF PASS-THROUGH BUSINESSES 
Increased use of payroll taxes is not the only way for states 
to take advantage of the continued federal deductibility of taxes 
imposed on businesses. Another possible response relies on the 
fact that many of the taxpayers who are going to be impacted by 
the SALT deduction repeal are receiving some or all of their in-
come through a pass-through entity. Thus, a similar strategy to 
the payroll tax response should work to restore federal SALT de-
ductibility for these taxpayers: increase state taxes on pass-
through entities while correspondingly reducing these taxes 
through the provision of offsetting individual-level tax credits.156 
To offset the increased pass-through-level taxes, individual tax 
credits could be offered equal to the amounts paid as new taxes 
by pass-through entities (as allocated to individual taxpayers). 
Notably, Connecticut has already passed a tax with this struc-
ture.157 
There are two primary legal challenges posed by this ap-
proach. First, as with the payroll tax strategy, there is the ques-
tion of whether the credit given to individual taxpayers should 
equal 100% of the increased pass-through-level taxes paid. A 
credit of less than 100% is likely to be stronger in the face of 
possible efforts by the IRS to restrict this strategy on substance-
over-form grounds.158  
The second challenge relates to the base of the new tax. Sup-
pose the entity-level tax is imposed on the capital stock of the 
business. This kind of tax is clearly imposed on the business and 
should be deductible under current federal law. However, what 
if the tax imposed on the entity is considered an income tax? Now 
the matter becomes a little trickier.  
As written, new section 164(b)(6) of the Internal Revenue 
Code operates in two steps: First, the new provision limits the 
aggregate deduction for state and local taxes to $10,000.159 In-
come taxes clearly count toward this limit.160 Second, the new 
provision explicitly permits deductions beyond the $10,000 cap 
if they “are paid or accrued in carrying on a trade or business or 
an activity described in section 212.”161 So, this second step 
 
 156. E.g., 2018 Conn. Acts 18-49 (Reg. Sess.) (codified in scattered sections 
of CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 12 (2018)). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text. 
 159. I.R.C. § 164(b)(6)(B) (2017). 
 160. Id. § 164(a)(3). 
 161. Id. § 164(b)(6). 
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makes it clear that taxes on businesses remain deductible, but 
the provision only lists real and personal property taxes and ex-
cludes income taxes.162 Taken to the limit, this omission of in-
come taxes could suggest that even corporations can no longer 
deduct their state-level corporate income tax payments.  
Yet there are several indications in the legislative history 
that this is not what Congress intended. For instance, the con-
ference report explains that “[u]nder the provision, in the case of 
an individual, State and local income, war profits, and excess 
profits taxes are not allowable as a deduction.”163 A footnote fur-
ther adds that:  
The proposal does not modify the deductibility of GST tax imposed on 
certain income distributions. Additionally, taxes imposed at the entity 
level, such as a business tax imposed on pass-through entities, that are 
reflected in a partner’s or S corporation shareholder’s distributive or 
pro-rata share of income or loss on a Schedule K-1 (or similar form), 
will continue to reduce such partner’s or shareholder’s distributive or 
pro-rata share of income as under present law.164  
Moreover, the interpretation that income taxes imposed on 
a business entity remain deductible makes sense more generally 
given the role of section 164. This is because section 164 provides 
a deduction to individuals whereas businesses—and other profit-
making enterprise—can deduct their tax payments under sec-
tions 162 and 62 without the need for section 164. An exclusion 
from section 164 should thus not be interpreted as denying a de-
duction that is not granted by section 164, but instead is granted 
by sections 162 and 62.  
Despite this logic, there remains legal uncertainty on ac-
count of new section 164 targeting income taxes in particular 
and not permitting an exception if the income tax is accrued in 
connection with carrying on a trade or business. Presumably the 
intent here was to make sure that, say, a plumber who does busi-
ness as a sole proprietor cannot deduct her income taxes any 
more than a plumber who is employed by someone else.165 At the 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. COMM. OF CONFERENCE, 115TH CONG., JOINT EXPLANATORY STATE-
MENT OF THE COMM. OF CONFERENCE 81 (2017) (emphasis added). 
 164. Id. at 80 n.172. 
 165. For some discussion of these issues as they played out, see David Ka-
min, State and Local Income Tax Deduction: Some Answers, More Questions, 
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same time, the self-employed plumber should be able to deduct 
the cost of property taxes levied on her place of business.166  
But what about the partner in a law firm if a tax is levied at 
the firm level? If the tax is a “business tax,” say a tax on the 
capital stock of the business or its payroll, then there seems to 
be no issue—it remains deductible. But what if the firm level tax 
is an income tax? This is the question that remains legally un-
certain. Thus, any state implementing the increased pass-
through taxation response strategy should give careful thought 
to these legal and design questions. With appropriate design, it 
seems clear that state governments can implement this strategy 
while remaining safely on the deductible side of the line.167  
Finally, it is worth noting that there are at least three policy 
justifications that could support a state adopting this strategy, 
beyond the goal of circumventing the new federal-level cap on 
SALT deductibility. First, as one of us has argued elsewhere, 
there are compelling reasons (apart from any considerations re-
lated to the new SALT deduction cap) for state governments to 
impose new taxes on pass-through entities.168 The essence of this 
argument is that the new federal pass-through deduction creates 
a host of incentives for taxpayers to recharacterize themselves 
as qualifying pass-through businesses,169 in addition to this new 
deduction making for questionable tax policy even without these 
distortionary gaming incentives.170 New state-level taxes on 
pass-through entities could thus counteract some of the harms 
created by the federal pass-through deduction by reducing or 
eliminating the unwarranted tax benefits provided.171  
The second policy justification arises from the longstanding 
problem that state revenue systems have taxed corporations at 
the entity level but not other forms of businesses. The primary 
reason why this has been the case is because of the administra-
 
 166. I.R.C. § 164(b)(6). 
 167. For instance, one way to do this is to have the tax base calculated based 
on the worth of business-level property rather than based on business-level in-
come. 
 168. See Darien Shanske, Another Way the Empire [State] Can Strike Back, 
MEDIUM: WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED (Jan. 4, 2018), https://medium.com/ 
whatever-source-derived/another-way-the-empire-state-can-strike-back 
-465d6496e928 (discussing progressivity, administrability, and efficiency). 
 169. See supra Part II. 
 170. See Shaviro, supra note 73, at 66–67 (describing the 2017 Act as “an 
ugly stain on the fabric of the U.S. federal income tax law”). 
 171. Shanske, supra note 168. 
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tive and other benefits state governments can achieve by piggy-
backing on the federal-level corporate income tax.172 However, 
given the rising importance of pass-through entities, it has be-
come increasingly problematic on policy grounds that state gov-
ernments disproportionately impose additional tax burdens only 
on corporations and not on pass-through business entities.173 Ac-
cordingly, state governments should arguably implement new 
taxes on pass-through entities even apart from any considera-
tions related to the federal SALT deduction. 
The third and final policy justification relates to how ex-
panding state-level taxation to all business entities could help 
improve state tax systems in other ways. For instance, it is com-
monly observed that states typically tax an ever narrower part 
of the consumption tax base with retail sales taxes, because 
states primarily tax the sales of tangible personal property and 
not, for example, services.174 Yet on the other side of every con-
sumption transaction is a business, and so an appropriately de-
signed tax on businesses can serve to improve the overall taxa-
tion of consumption transactions within a state.175 There is much 
more that could be said about this policy justification, and, of 
course, the implementation details are of crucial importance. 
However, our point here is that there are defensible policy justi-
fications for new state-level business taxes that could serve as 
partial end runs around the new federal SALT deductibility cap 
and that these justifications would arguably support implement-
ing these new state-level taxes even apart from any considera-
tions related to the federal SALT deduction cap.  
D. REFORM POSSIBILITIES 
As with the section 199A deduction, the fundamental prob-
lem with the capping of the SALT deduction is that it was not 
based on a coherent principle.176 This lack of principle provides 
 
 172. David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Fed-
eralism in the United States, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 295, 337–38 (2017). 
 173. Id. at 319–25, 352–53. 
 174. Id. at 364–65. 
 175. For discussion of one such structure—that of New Hampshire’s Busi-
ness Enterprise Tax—see id. at 350–52. 
 176. For further elaboration, see David Gamage & Darien Shanske, The Fu-
ture of SALT: A Broader Picture, 88 ST. TAX NOTES 1275, 1275 (2018) (“[T]hese 
changes are not consistent with any theory . . . .”); see also Daniel Jacob Hemel, 
The Death and Life of the State and Local Tax Deduction, 72 TAX L. REV. (forth-
coming 2019).  
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both the means and the rationale for the efforts currently under-
way in some states to circumvent the new cap.177 We will con-
clude by briefly considering other reform options to illustrate 
these points. 
It is true that capping the SALT deduction is a progressive 
change made by the new law, but the overall law is highly re-
gressive and so progressivity is an incongruous justification for 
the change to the SALT deduction. Moreover, capping the SALT 
deduction has the effect of making it more difficult for states to 
fund themselves with progressive taxes.178 In short, a principled 
progressive reform of the SALT deduction would either turn it 
into a credit in order to make it more widely available or would 
pair limiting the deduction with reducing the fiscal burden on 
the states so that the states would have less need to impose pro-
gressive taxes. 
Alternatively, one might argue that the SALT deduction was 
always too generous, that on income tax principles at least some 
portion of state and local taxes represents a consumption choice 
and should not be deductible.179 Yet that theory hardly justifies 
setting an arbitrary $10,000 cap. Instead, that theory would be 
more consonant with limiting the SALT deduction to some per-
centage of state and local taxes, say 50%, phased in over time. 
As a final alternative, the federal government might want 
to influence the tax mix used by the states. There are potentially 
good reasons for this motive, including the goals of increasing 
state fiscal stability by encouraging use of the property taxes, or 
of discouraging the use of the state corporate income tax because 
of the disruption that tax causes to interstate businesses.180 Both 
of these goals could be achieved through revision of the SALT 
deduction. 
But the new SALT cap was not designed in a manner that 
would promote any of these, arguably, valid goals, nor even a 
plausible mix of such goals.181 This lack of principle invites state 
governments to enact workarounds, as does capping the SALT 
deduction but not capping substitutes like the charitable deduc-
tion.182 Moreover, whatever the ultimate fate of the state govern-
ment workarounds that have already been enacted and that are 
 
 177. See supra Parts III.A–C. 
 178. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 176. 
 180. Id.  
 181. Id. 
 182. David Kamin, Sustainable Solutions for SALT, MEDIUM: WHATEVER 
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currently being considered, we think it inevitable that—absent 
future federal legislation—a substantial amount of state govern-
ment workaround attempts will eventually succeed.183 After all, 
it is clearly permitted for state governments to, for instance, 
simply swap toward greater use of corporate income taxes in 
place of capped individual level taxes.184  
Overall, in contrast to section 199A, which would be best re-
formed by being eliminated, there are valid arguments favoring 
reform of the SALT deduction. A better designed SALT deduc-
tion cap might well be preferable to restoring the SALT deduc-
tion to the status it held in 2017, especially if enacting this new, 
better-designed cap were accompanied by further principled re-
forms. Again, the essential problems with how the tax legislation 
capped the SALT deduction arise from the unprincipled nature 
and hasty enactment of this cap.185 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL GAMES, ROADBLOCKS, AND 
GLITCHES   
The new tax legislation’s international tax provisions are 
among the most complex of the changes made by the new tax 
legislation. These reforms deserve serious attention and, as il-
lustrated below, present numerous gaming opportunities, ad-
verse consequences under international law, and undesirable in-
centives to locate investment and assets abroad.  
To be sure, the old system of U.S. international tax rules, 
prior to the new tax legislation, was also the subject of consider-
able tax gaming and inefficiency. As measured against the base-
line of old law, some of the new rules represent modest improve-
ments. However, these new rules fare worse when judged 
against a normatively ideal system. They also, overall, fare 
poorly in solving problems in the old regime.186 Regardless, our 
 
SOURCE DERIVED (May 22, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source 
-derived/sustainable-solutions-for-salt-1adeb5c89890.  
 183. Id. 
 184. See supra Part III.C. 
 185. See Shaviro, supra note 73. 
 186. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that nearly 80% of 
profit shifting is maintained under the new regime. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 
BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2018 TO 2028, at 124, 127 (2018), 
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53651 
-outlook.pdf. The effect on profit shifting is likely even smaller, however, since 
the CBO does not take into account investor reactions to the instability of the 
foreign derived intangible income (FDII) regime in response to World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) challenges, investor reactions to the political instability of the 
legislation in general, and tax competition from other countries. See discussion 
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primary purpose here is to explain how the new system of rules 
created by the tax legislation will introduce problems that 
should be addressed either through regulation or further legis-
lation.  
By way of background, the basic structure of the new tax 
legislation’s international reforms is to: (1) exempt foreign in-
come of certain U.S. corporations from taxation in the United 
States (the quasi-territorial or participation-exemption system); 
(2) backstop this new territorial system with a 10.5% “minimum 
tax” on certain foreign-source income (the GILTI regime); (3) 
provide a special low rate on export income (the FDII regime); 
and (4) target profit-stripping by U.S. firms making deductible 
payments to foreign affiliates (the BEAT regime).187 
In the remainder of this Part, we discuss selected technical 
problems within the latter three of these new regimes, in turn.188  
 
infra Part IV.B. 
 187. See generally COMM. OF CONFERENCE, 115TH CONG., JOINT EXPLANA-
TORY STATEMENT OF THE COMM. OF CONFERENCE 429–65 (2017) (discussing 
changes to international tax provisions). The new regime maintains the subpart 
F rules, which tax currently at the regular 21% domestic rate foreign passive 
income and base income. I.R.C. §§ 951–65 (2017) (incorporating section 11 do-
mestic taxation rate). Indeed, the new legislation strengthened subpart F, albeit 
in a minor fashion, by expanding the definition of a U.S. shareholder. Id. 
§ 951(b). Good tax planning, including use of check-the-box rules, however, 
means that Subpart F stands as more of a sieve than a barrier to profit shifting. 
See, e.g., Lawrence Lokken, Whatever Happened to Subpart F? U.S. CFC Legis-
lation After the Check-the-Box Regulations, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 185, 196–99 (2005) 
(discussing the use of hybrid entities to defeat subpart F) . 
Indeed, the new legislation opens up sheltering opportunities using the sub-
part F rules. Suppose, for instance, a wealthy individual has no need for cash 
and wants to invest in bonds or in an equity trading strategy. She forms a cor-
poration in a tax haven, contributes the cash to the corporation, and directs it 
to make the investments. Under section 962, an individual U.S. shareholder of 
a controlled foreign corporation can elect to be taxed on subpart F income at the 
corporate tax rate. Although a second tax is imposed on distributions, an indi-
vidual can avoid that level of tax by not having the corporation distribute in-
come. Upon her death, the heirs will get a stepped-up basis, per operation of 
section 1014, and can sell the corporation free of all tax, assuming the corpora-
tion is sold to a foreigner. Additionally, the personal holding company rules, 
sections 541–47, do not apply to foreign corporations, and the accumulated 
earnings tax rules, sections 531–37, allow for a deduction for subpart F income. 
I.R.C. § 535(b)(10). Effectively, the section 962 election allows for a better in-
vestment vehicle than a domestic C corporation because the controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) is not subject to the personal holding company or accumu-
lated tax regimes and upon death, a foreign purchaser is not subject to any la-
tent U.S. tax liability. Thanks to David Miller for this point. See also Lee A. 
Sheppard, Private Investment Funds and the TCJA, 159 TAX NOTES 1397, 1400 
(2018). 
 188. For additional views on the regime by individual authors of this Article, 
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A. PROBLEMS WITH THE GILTI REGIME 
The new tax legislation imposes a minimum tax on “global 
intangible low-taxed income” (GILTI) of controlled foreign corpo-
rations,189 which is intended to stop U.S. corporations from shift-
ing profits out of the United States.190 Specifically, GILTI im-
poses current tax at the regular domestic rate on certain 
earnings of such corporations and then effectively provides a re-
duced minimum tax rate of 10.5% through a 50% deduction.191 
The need for an anti-abuse regime like GILTI partially arises 
because the new tax legislation’s switch from a worldwide sys-
tem (whereby the income of foreign subsidiaries earned abroad 
was merely deferred) to a territorial system (whereby this in-
come is exempted altogether) would exacerbate profit shifting.192 
However, the new GILTI regime, as structured, is highly 
problematic. This is due to the offshoring incentives that are cre-
ated by the regime as well as the fact that it is applied on a 
global, rather than per-country basis, as discussed below.193  
1. Implications of a Global Minimum Tax  
The new tax legislation allows foreign tax credits on a global 
basis (rather than per-country).194 Firms are therefore incentiv-
ized to locate investment in low-tax countries and blend that in-
come with income from high-tax countries.  
 
see Early Impressions of New Tax Law Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 115th Cong. 
(2018) (statement of Rebecca M. Kysar, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School), 
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/24APR2018KysarSTMNT.pdf; 
Daniel N. Shaviro, The New Non-Territorial U.S. International Tax System, 
Part 1, 160 TAX NOTES 57 (2018) [hereinafter Shaviro Part 1]; Daniel N. 
Shaviro, The New Non-Territorial U.S. International Tax System, Part 2, 160 
TAX NOTES 171 (2018) [hereinafter Shaviro Part 2]. 
 189. Controlled foreign corporations are those foreign corporations in which 
more than 50% of the stock is owned by U.S. shareholders owning at least 10% 
of the corporation. I.R.C. § 957(a). 
 190. Id. § 951A. 
 191. Id. §§ 250(a)(1)(B), 951A. For tax years beginning after 2025, the 50% 
deduction is reduced to 37.5%, and thus the effective rate on GILTI goes up to 
13.125% in those years. Id. § 250(a)(3). 
 192. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, REPORT NO. 1394, REPORT ON THE 
GILTI PROVISIONS OF THE CODE 15–17 (2018), http://www.nysba.org/Sections/ 
Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_Section_Reports_2018/1394_Report.html. 
 193. We focus on the larger policy problems posed by GILTI. For a detailed 
account of the technical issues presented by GILTI, see generally id. (including 
discussions and recommendations for changes to the GILTI provisions). 
 194. I.R.C. § 951A(a). 
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For instance, say a corporation earns $1,000,000 of income 
in Country A, which is taxed locally at a 21% rate. Further as-
sume that there are no real assets abroad, so that the GILTI 
hurdle rate of 10% (discussed infra) does not apply. Further as-
sume that the corporation is choosing where to locate an addi-
tional $2,000,000 in profits (and any associated activity), with 
the choice being between the United States and a tax haven.195 
There would be a $210,000 Country A tax and a tentative 
U.S. GILTI tax on this Country A income of $105,000 ($1,000,000 
x 10.5%). The firm would, however, get to credit 80% of the 
$210,000 Country A tax, reducing the U.S. tax to zero.196 This 
would leave $63,000 of excess foreign tax credits ($105,000 – 
[$210,000 x .8] = -$63,000) that are lost forever under the GILTI 
rules. 
If an additional $2,000,000 were earned in the United 
States, the 21% U.S. tax thereon would be $420,000 and the 
$63,000 of excess credit for Country A tax could not be used to 
reduce this liability. Thus, the corporation’s total tax liability 
(both U.S. and foreign) would be $630,000 ($210,000 Country A 
tax + $0 post-credit U.S. tax on the first $1,000,000 of Country A 
income + $420,000 U.S. tax on the additional $2,000,000 of U.S. 
income). 
 
 195. This example does not take into account the section 78 grossup or the 
possible allocation of expenses under the preexisting regulations for section 961 
that could reduce allowable foreign tax credits perhaps contrary to congres-
sional intent. Martin A. Sullivan, More GILTI Than You Thought, 158 TAX 
NOTES 845, 848–49 (2018). The expense allocation could have a large effect on 
the amount of tax owed under GILTI. Id. A host of other taxpayer unfriendly 
problems exist in the GILTI regime, which others have explored. Assets in CFCs 
that generate losses are disregarded for purposes of calculating the deemed re-
turn on tangible property. Id. at 847–48. Additionally, non-C-corporation share-
holders may be unable to take foreign tax credits against liability for GILTI 
(unless they make an election under section 962). Id. at 846; see Sandra P. 
McGill et al., GILTI Rules Particularly Onerous for Non-C Corporation CFC 
Shareholders, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY: THOUGHT LEADERSHIP (Jan. 30, 
2018), https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/publications/2018/01/ 
gilti-rules-particularly-onerous-nonc-corporation. Under current law, GILTI de-
ductions in excess of income are permanently disallowed and cannot create net 
operating losses (NOLs). I.R.C. § 250(a)(2)(B). Similarly, multinationals cannot 
carryover excess credits within the GILTI basket to future years. See Sullivan, 
supra, at 846. Both of these provisions burden businesses with volatile earnings, 
and may, like other loss limitations in the Code, distort investment away from 
risky assets. See Shaviro Part 2, supra note 188, at 181. These concerns, to-
gether with other issues such as the uncertainty over whether the foreign tax 
credit gross-up goes into the GILTI basket and questions over whether the 
GILTI should be a separate basket from branch income, will continue to chal-
lenge tax planners. 
 196. I.R.C. § 960(d). 
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Now assume the additional $2,000,000 of income was in-
stead earned in a tax haven, Country B, which taxes the income 
at a 0% rate. Looking at that investment on a standalone basis, 
this would produce $210,000 of GILTI liability with no foreign 
tax credit offset. If the GILTI were applied on a per country ba-
sis, this would mean the company was paying $210,000 foreign 
taxes on Country A income and $210,000 of U.S. taxes on Coun-
try B GILTI, with total taxes of $420,000.197  
Under current law, however, firms are able to cross-credit 
or blend low-income and high-income taxes together, thereby re-
ducing their GILTI liability. Thus, under the current GILTI re-
gime, the total foreign taxes imposed would be $210,000 (im-
posed by Country A), 80% of which ($168,000) is creditable 
against the 10.5% tax on the $3,000,000 of total Country A and 
Country B GILTI. This produces a $147,000 U.S. tax liability 
([10.5% x $3,000,000] - 168,000), with total foreign and U.S. 
taxes of $357,000.  
Why is the bill lower as compared to the per country ap-
proach? Because the $63,000 excess credits from Country A par-
tially offset the $210,000 U.S. tax on Country B GILTI. This re-
duces the total tax liability (U.S. and foreign) to $357,000 (as 
opposed to $420,000 if we had a per country GILTI tax and 
$630,000 if the investment were made in the United States). 
In this manner, the global minimum tax enacted by the new 
tax legislation pushes countries towards investing abroad as op-
posed to the United States. Firms will attempt to create a stream 
of zero tax income that brings the average foreign taxes down to 
the minimum rate. Note that, through this blending technique, 
a firm can also shield profits in tax havens by choosing to invest 
in high-tax countries. A firm may even prefer to invest in coun-
tries with higher tax rates than the United States, since income 
and taxes from such countries can be used to blend down the U.S. 
minimum tax to zero.198 This puts the United States at a com-
 
 197. See Stephen E. Shay et al., Designing a 21st Century Corporate Tax—
An Advance U.S. Minimum Tax on Foreign Income and Other Measures to Pro-
tect the Base, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 669, 706 (2015) (recommending that any mini-
mum tax be determined on a per-country basis); see also J. Clifton Fleming Jr. 
et al., Incorporating a Minimum Tax in a Territorial System, 157 TAX NOTES 
73, 80 (2017) (same). 
 198. For instance, if a firm already has tax haven income and is considering 
where to put a plant, assuming that the firm cannot locate the plant in a tax 
haven due to labor pool and/or legal environment considerations, it may well 
prefer a high-tax foreign country to the United States since the high-tax foreign 
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petitive disadvantage, making it more likely that jobs and in-
vestment go to countries like Sweden.  
Troublingly, this feature worsens the dynamics discussed 
below that are created by the GILTI hurdle rate for offshore tan-
gible assets. Critics of a per-country approach argue that it 
would be too complex administratively;199 but the primary tar-
gets of the GILTI are sophisticated multinational corporations 
that can effectively deal with the challenge of computational 
complexity. Moreover, the blending technique itself requires sig-
nificant resources and complex tax planning, and a global mini-
mum tax would eliminate the need for such inefficient maneu-
vering.  
Proponents of the global approach might argue that the per-
country approach punishes multinationals that naturally con-
duct integrated production in high- and low-tax countries for 
non-tax reasons.200 The national welfare objective implicated in 
cross-crediting for non-tax purposes, however, may likely out-
weigh this concern.201 
2. The Deemed Ten Percent Return 
The new tax legislation exempts from the GILTI minimum 
tax a deemed 10% return on tangible assets abroad, measured 
by tax basis.202 Hence, this rule encourages U.S. firms to locate 
tangible assets (and accompanying jobs) overseas. This is be-
cause the more the corporation increases its U.S. tax basis in 
foreign assets abroad, the smaller the tax base subject to 
GILTI.203  
 
country can produce excess credits. 
 199. See Sullivan, supra note 195, at 845. 
 200. See Shaviro Part 2, supra note 188, at 184. 
 201. See id. (discussing the tension between these two viewpoints). 
 202. The new expensing provision does not apply for purposes of determining 
asset basis under GILTI or FDII (discussed infra Part IV.B) regimes. I.R.C. 
§§ 250(b)(2)(B), 951A(d)(3) (2017). Instead, the slower depreciation schedule of 
section 168(g) is used. See id. §§ 168(g), 951A(d)(3).  
 203. The tax bill also changes the rules governing where income is sourced 
when it comes from inventory that is partly produced in the United States and 
partly produced abroad. Id. § 863(b)(2). Prior law allowed taxpayers to effec-
tively allocate half of the income to foreign sources by designating title to pass 
abroad. I.R.C. § 863(b) (1997) (amended 2017). The new provision simply looks 
at location of production, which, like the minimum tax formula, may further 
incentivize firms to locate real production activities abroad. I.R.C. § 863(b) 
(2017) (apportioning “solely on the basis of the production activities”). 
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Consider a firm that invests $10,000,000 in a plant abroad 
that will generate $1,000,000 of income. The firm will get to ex-
empt all of that $1,000,000 of income through the deemed 10% 
return so that there is no U.S. tax. By contrast, a firm investing 
in a $10,000,000 plant in the United States that will generate 
$1,000,000 of income pays U.S. tax of $210,000 (21% of 
$1,000,000).204  
Where there happens to be non-exempt return to tangible 
assets (return in excess of 10%), this is taxed by the GILTI re-
gime at 10.5% instead of the 21% rate applicable to domestic in-
come. The minimum tax in this case might also be zero if the 
taxpayer pays enough overall foreign taxes. To build on the 
above example, assume that the $10,000,000 plant now gener-
ates $2,000,000 (instead of $1,000,000). The firm will still get to 
exempt $1,000,000 of the income through the deemed 10% re-
turn, but the other $1,000,000 will be subject to the GILTI re-
gime and taxed at an effective rate of 10.5%. This would produce 
U.S. tax of $105,000 (10.5% of $1,000,000), as compared to U.S. 
tax of $420,000 (21% of $2,000,000) on a similar U.S. based in-
vestment.  
This analysis, thus far, excludes foreign taxes. Higher local 
taxes abroad can sway the calculus of where to invest back to 
favoring the United States. We might then expect the GILTI re-
gime to encourage offshoring only where low-taxed countries are 
a viable alternative location. The ability to cross-credit income 
through the global feature of the minimum tax, however, com-
plicates this analysis, making offshoring more likely.205  
Of course, non-tax considerations, such as the quality of the 
labor force, will also affect the decision of whether to invest in 
the United States versus abroad. Such considerations may weigh 
against locating in a tax haven.206 Even with these additional 
layers of analysis, we can expect the GILTI regime, at the mar-
gins, to induce taxpayers to increase their tangible assets 
abroad, carrying jobs along with them. These dynamics run con-
trary to Congress’s pronounced policy objective of discouraging 
offshoring.  
 
 204. I.R.C. § 11. Note that the rate on the income from the U.S. plant would 
be lower if such income was export income, which is effectively taxed at a 
13.125% rate in the new tax legislation. Id. § 250(a). Note also that the firm will 
get to expense investments of tangible property, but not real estate. Id. § 168(k). 
 205. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 206. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
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3. Reform Possibilities 
The offshoring incentives created by GILTI are fundamental 
to the structure of the new legislation and cannot be cured by 
regulation.207 Going forward, Congress could restore balance to 
the GILTI regime through relatively easy, at least from a design 
perspective, legislative fixes.208  
The former U.S. international tax system has been de-
scribed as a worldwide system of taxation since it subjected for-
eign earnings to U.S. taxation (whereas a territorial system of 
taxation exempts such earnings).209 That being said, the former 
system never fully taxed such earnings since taxation could be 
deferred, even indefinitely, on active income earned by foreign 
subsidiaries.210 It thus could be more properly described as a 
quasi-worldwide system.211  
In contrast, the new regime has been labeled a territorial 
system since 10% corporate shareholders can exempt the foreign 
income of foreign subsidiaries altogether through the new par-
ticipation exemption system.212 Here again, however, we see the 
meaninglessness of such labels since smaller corporate share-
 
 207. The conference report suggests that certain non-economic transactions 
be disregarded in this context, however this language will not discourage firms 
from locating real assets offshore in order to reduce the minimum tax since such 
transactions will produce real economic consequences. H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, 
at 645 (2017). The report goes further to state that:  
the conferees expect the Secretary to prescribe regulations to address 
transactions that occur after the measurement date of post-1986 earn-
ings and profits under [the provision on one-time repatriation], but be-
fore the first taxable year for which [the GILTI provision] applies 
[2018], if such transactions are undertaken to increase [qualified busi-
ness asset investment]. 
Id. This language is aimed at transitional planning tactics like those identified 
by Stephen Shay rather than the asset shifting problem we identify. Stephen 
Shay, Tax Reform – Process Failures, Loopholes and Wealth Windfalls 2–4 
(Nov. 21, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3076151. 
 208. For reform options regarding the new international tax provisions gen-
erally, including those suggested in prior versions of this Article, see JANE G. 
GRAVELLE & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45186, ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION: THE 2017 REVISION (P.L. 115-97) 32–41 
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45186.pdf. 
 209. See id. at 1. 
 210. Id. at 2. 
 211. Id.; see MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R44013, CORPORATE TAX BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (BEPS): 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE DATA 17 (2015) (discussing the futility of the world-
wide and territorial labels); Shaviro Part 1, supra note 188, at 58 (same). 
 212. I.R.C. § 245A (2017). 
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holders and individuals are still subject to taxation on their for-
eign income.213 Furthermore, the GILTI regime means that even 
foreign income of 10% corporate shareholders is likely subject to 
some U.S. taxation. These worldwide-type features were re-
tained since a move to a pure territorial system would worsen 
profit shifting incentives by exempting foreign-source income al-
together (rather than just allowing it to be deferred without cur-
rent U.S. taxation).214 
It has been pointed out that the GILTI regime could be 
viewed as either a transition to a more pure worldwide system 
of taxation, achieved after raising the rate of minimum tax, or, 
as a stepping stone to a more pure territorial system, achieved 
after lowering the rate.215 Experts worried about profit shifting 
will likely advocate for the former, and those concerned about 
competitiveness and inversions by U.S. companies will likely 
press for the latter.216 It is impossible to predict in which direc-
tion the U.S. system will evolve, but it is almost certain that the 
system will continue on in hybrid form, somewhere between ter-
ritorial and worldwide.217 
Generally speaking, we think the existence of a partial ter-
ritorial system coupled with a minimum tax as a backstop is an 
improvement over the prior worldwide system with deferral of 
active foreign income.218 From a revenue and base protection 
standpoint, it is also preferable to a system that would com-
pletely exempt such earnings. Nonetheless, although a mini-
mum tax can work in theory, its current GILTI incarnation pre-
sents the problematic offshoring and profit shifting incentives 
discussed above.  
The problem of cross-crediting could be addressed by moving 
to a per-country minimum tax rather than one done on a global 
 
 213. Id. § 951. 
 214. Fleming et al., supra note 197, at 76. 
 215. Id.  
 216. For a skeptical account of whether inversions can be explained by an 
anti-competitive U.S. tax environment, see Edward D. Kleinbard, ‘Competitive-
ness’ Has Nothing to Do With It, 144 TAX NOTES 1055 (2014). 
 217. See KEIGHTLEY & STUPAK, supra note 211; Shaviro Part 1, supra note 
188, at 58. 
 218. See generally J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. 
Shay, Worse Than Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79 (2009) (criticizing the deferral 
system). 
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basis.219 Although administratively more complex, many com-
mentators have endorsed such an approach given its favorable 
effect on base erosion and revenue concerns.220 Moving to a per-
country approach would also reduce the offshoring incentives in 
the bill, at least for those countries with corporate tax rates at 
or above that of the United States.  
One way to target the offshoring incentives created by the 
GILTI regime could be to change the tax base of the regime. In-
stead of allowing an exemption for a return on foreign tangible 
assets, for instance, the minimum tax could apply to all foreign 
source (non-Subpart F) income.221 Another way to close the gap 
between foreign income and domestic income would be to keep 
the 10% hurdle rate but subject the excess to the normal corpo-
rate rate of 21% (rather than the 10.5% rate).222  
Still another option would be to set the deemed return on 
foreign tangible asset basis at a lower rate than 10%. Congress 
presumably chose the 10% hurdle rate so that the GILTI regime 
would capture income only from intangibles, since these gener-
ate higher rates of return. The rate Congress chose, however, is 
arbitrary.223 The deemed return on tangible assets is set rela-
 
 219. This approach has been pursued in recently proposed legislation. Per-
Country Minimum Act, H.R. 6015, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 220. KEIGHTLY & STUPAK, supra note 211, at 17–18; Fleming et al., supra 
note 197, at 77. 
 221. President Obama’s budget included a proposed 19% minimum tax on 
the foreign earnings of controlled foreign corporations or foreign branches or 
from the performance of services abroad. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL 
EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PRO-
POSALS 19–22 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/ 
Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf. Like the GILTI regime, the 
minimum tax proposal would have exempted a return on foreign assets. Id. at 
21. Another minimum tax proposal would exempt active foreign business in-
come. This proposal is similar to one introduced by Senator Enzi. S. 2091, 112th 
Cong. (2012). For other minimum tax proposals, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 113TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 
2014 (2014); Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Baucus Unveils Pro-
posal for International Tax Reform (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.finance 
.senate.gov/chairmans-news/baucus-unveils-proposals-for-international-tax 
-reform. 
 222. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, How Terrible Is the New Tax Law? Reflections on 
TRA17 5 n.4 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series Draft Paper  No. 586, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3095830; see also Fleming et al., supra note 197, at 78 (giving ex-
amples of the interaction between corporate and foreign tax rates). 
 223. The normal rate of return is the lowest rate of return that will attract 
investment. Normal rates of return are exceeded due to intangibles, monopoly 
power, monopsony power, exchange rate variations, among other variables. See 
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tively high at 10% as compared to the risk-free return on Treas-
ury yields.224 This allows a great deal of a company’s return on 
investments in real assets abroad to be completely exempt from 
U.S. taxation. Instead, the deemed normal return could be the 
short-term risk-free rate or such rate as adjusted by a variable, 
contemporaneous measure of market performance.225  
These solutions could all be critiqued as moving too far in 
the direction of worldwide taxation. If this is a concern, the min-
imum tax could be imposed at a lower rate. Caution should be 
taken in lowering the rate, however, since this would impact rev-
enues and would also lead to increased profit shifting and base 
erosion by widening the disparity between the domestic rate and 
the foreign minimum rate.  
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE FDII REGIME 
Whereas the GILTI regime was intended as the stick for 
earning income from intangibles abroad, the foreign-derived in-
tangible income (FDII) regime was intended to be the carrot for 
earning such income within the United States.226 To this end, 
FDII provides an effective rate of tax of 13.125%227 on so called 
foreign-derived intangible income to keep intellectual property 
within the United States. In theory, a domestic corporation’s 
FDII is its portion of intangible income derived from foreign mar-
kets. However, as is the case with the GILTI regime, the intan-
gible aspect comes only from defining the FDII base as the excess 
over the deemed return on tangible investment rather than as 
intangible income per se. This distinguishes FDII from other pa-
 
MARTIN A. SULLIVAN, TAX NOTES, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: WHERE WILL THE FAC-
TORIES GO? A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 4 (2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/ 
tax-reform/economic-analysis-where-will-factories-go-preliminary-assessment. 
Moreover, there is no requirement that intangibles be present in order to trigger 
the GILTI regime. Id. at 2. 
 224. I.R.C. §§ 1291(c)(3), 6621 (2017). 
 225. See Shaviro Part 2, supra note 188, at 182 (suggesting a market rate of 
interest). 
 226. A perhaps more accurate description is that GILTI is itself a carrot. 
After all, 10.5% is better than 21%. Under this view, FDII is simply a tastier 
carrot. Chris William Sanchirico, The New U.S. Tax Preference for “Foreign-de-
rived Intangible Income”, 71 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171091. 
 227. This lower rate is effectively achieved through a 37.5% deduction. At 
the 21% corporate rate, this amounts to a 13.125% rate on FDII. I.R.C. 
§ 250(a)(1). For tax years beginning after 2025, the 37.5% deduction is reduced 
to 21.875%, and thus the effective rate on FDII goes up to 16.406% in those 
years. Id. § 250(a)(3). 
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tent box regimes, which grant tax incentives to patents and cop-
yright software, because it instead includes branding and other 
market-based intangibles.228  
1. WTO Violations 
Problematically, the FDII regime is likely an illegal export 
subsidy in violation of WTO agreements.229 Accordingly, it has 
the danger of reviving a three-decades long controversy between 
the United States and the European Union that was thought to 
have been put to rest in 2004.230 This is because the greater the 
U.S. taxpayer’s income from exports, the more of its income gets 
taxed at the FDII 13.125% rate (as opposed to the full 21% cor-
porate rate).  
Specifically, FDII is defined as the amount that bears the 
same ratio to the corporation’s “deemed intangible income” as its 
“foreign-derived deduction eligible income” bears to its “deduc-
tion eligible income.”231 “Deemed intangible income” is the ex-
cess of a domestic corporation’s “deduction eligible income” (es-
sentially modified gross income, determined without regard to 
subpart F income, GILTI, and a few other enumerated catego-
ries) over its “deemed tangible income return” (10% of its basis 
in its tangible assets).232  
In turn, “foreign-derived deduction eligible income” is de-
fined as income derived in connection with (1) property that is 
sold by the taxpayer to any foreign person for a foreign use or (2) 
services to any foreign person or with respect to foreign property. 
 
 228. Altmaier et al., EU Finance Ministers Warn Against Proposed U.S. Tax 
Measures, TAX NOTES (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.taxnotes.com/beps-expert/ 
base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps/eu-finance-ministers-warn-against 
-proposed-us-tax-measures/2017/12/11/1xdr8.  
 229. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its later 
WTO-enforced incarnations limit export subsidies (in addition to tariffs on im-
ports). Export subsidies can include income tax incentives, and these agree-
ments have indeed been used against several U.S. tax regimes. See, e.g., Paul 
R. McDaniel, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Trade Agreements and Income 
Taxation: Interactions, Conflicts, and Resolutions, 57 TAX L. REV. 275, 280–83 
(2004).  
 230. For prior discussion by one of us, see Rebecca Kysar, The Senate Tax 
Plan Has a WTO Problem, MEDIUM: WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED (Nov. 12, 
2017), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/the-senate-tax-plan-has-a 
-wto-problem-guest-post-by-rebecca-kysar-31deee86eb99. 
 231. I.R.C. § 250(b). 
 232. Id.  
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In other words, this category comprises exports for property and 
services.233 
In summary, a U.S. company’s foreign derived intangible in-
come is the amount that bears the same ratio to the deemed in-
tangible income as the U.S. company’s exports bear to its modi-
fied gross income. Another way of looking at this is that a 
percentage of income from exports is taxed at the 13.125% rate, 
the percentage being the ratio of the deemed intangible income 
of the U.S. company to the modified gross income of the U.S. 
company. The greater the income from exports, the greater the 
amount of income that gets the 13.125% rate, which is a subsidy 
in comparison with the baseline 21% rate that would apply to 
imports. 
Because the FDII regime benefits exports, it violates WTO 
obligations—specifically, Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). The SCM prohibits (a) 
subsidies that are contingent, in law or fact, upon export perfor-
mance and (b) subsidies that are contingent upon the use of do-
mestic over imported goods.234 Article 1 of the SCM defines a 
subsidy as a financial contribution by a government, including 
the non-collection or forgiveness of taxes otherwise due.235 If a 
country enacts export subsidies, other countries can impose 
countervailing measures against it.236 
The language regarding “taxes otherwise due” raises base-
line questions. It has been suggested that the proper baseline 
should be a territorial system, allowing for participation exemp-
tion.237 Since a taxpayer could just incorporate abroad and take 
advantage of that system, then judged against that baseline, the 
13.125% rate cannot be seen as forgiveness or non-collection of 
taxes otherwise due. WTO rulings, however, tend to be formalis-
tic238 and do not generally anticipate taxpayer responses. For in-
stance, in judging prior export subsidies, the WTO implicitly ig-
nored the fact that a firm could park its income offshore and 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 3.1, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM].  
 235. Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii).  
 236. See, e.g., id. at art. 7.9. 
 237. See Sanchirico, supra note 226, at 9–12.  
 238. See Steve Lohr, New Approach to Corporate Tax Law has House G.O.P. 
Support, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016) (quoting Michael Graetz as characterizing 
WTO lawyers as embracing formalism).  
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grind its tax rate down to zero through deferral.239 Instead, prior 
export subsidies were judged against a system of worldwide tax-
ation without deferral.  
Furthermore, it is unclear why the comparison should be the 
taxation of foreign subsidiaries given that the FDII regime also 
benefits domestic corporations without foreign operations at all. 
For such corporations to receive the FDII deduction, they need 
only export goods. It thus seems odd to call upon them to incor-
porate abroad in an imagined exercise if they have no activity 
abroad. Instead, the proper baseline should be the applicable tax 
rate imposed on the domestic corporation as if it had sold its 
goods here, rather than exported them—21%.  
The United States may also argue that intangible income 
lies outside the scope of the WTO agreements,240 but the intan-
gible income in the legislation is simply a deemed portion of the 
income from the sale of tangible goods241 Exports of tangible 
goods are clearly covered by the agreements,242 and thus the 
FDII rate will almost certainly fall within their scope. Because 
FDII amounts to the non-collection or forgiveness of taxes other-
wise due on an export, it likely will be considered a prohibited 
export subsidy under SCM. Accordingly, our trading partners 
will likely impose sanctions, either unilaterally or after approval 
from the WTO’s Dispute Resolution Body.243  
It is important to note that the history of this controversy is 
long and tortured, beginning in 1971 with tax provisions that 
were enacted by the Nixon Administration and designed to help 
exports (the Domestic International Sales Corporation or DISC 
provisions).244 Almost immediately, the European Community 
 
 239. See generally DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, CONG. RES. SERVICES, A HISTORY 
OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL INCOME (EIT) AND FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION 
(FSC) EXPORT TAX-BENEFIT CONTROVERSY 1, 6, 8, 11–12, 14, 18 (2006).  
 240. This argument was briefly raised by GOP Senators in markup.  
 241. I.R.C. § 250(b) (2017). 
 242. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (creating trade rules for imports and exports of 
goods). 
 243. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Elephant Always Forgets: Tax Reform and 
the WTO 5 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 18-001, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3095349. 
 244. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 501–07, 85 Stat. 535–53 
(1971). For a history of the export tax subsidy controversy, see DAVID L. BRUM-
BAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31660, A HISTORY OF THE EXTRATERRITO-
RIAL INCOME (ETI) AND FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION (FSC) EXPORT TAX-BEN-
EFIT CONTROVERSY (2006).  
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contested the DISC provisions under GATT, the WTO’s predeces-
sor.245 In 1976, a GATT panel ruled against DISC,246 and the 
United States eventually replaced the system with the FSC pro-
visions in 1984.247 
The WTO would later rule against the FSC system.248 In 
2000, Congress enacted the ETI system to replace the illegal For-
eign Sales Corporation system.249 Yet, in 2002 the WTO decided 
that the tax benefits provided under ETI were illegal export sub-
sidies.250 Congress eventually gave up the fight. The repeal of ETI 
was the impetus for the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (and 
the now repealed section 199 deduction for domestic manufactur-
ing).251 
As a result of the new tax legislation, we can thus expect this 
protracted battle to be reignited. Taxpayers should expect insta-
bility in this area, and the United States should prepare for WTO 
litigation. Indeed, just before the bill was passed, the foreign fi-
nance ministers of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain 
sent a letter to Treasury Secretary Mnuchin warning him of the 
possible WTO violations in this regime.252  
If history is any guide, the United States will abandon the 
export subsidy regime under threat of sanctions. Another possi-
ble outcome, however, is that Congress and the Trump admin-
istration continue down the path of economic nationalism and 
simply pay sanctions instead of changing the law in response to 
a negative WTO ruling.253  
 
 245. Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), L/4422, Nov. 
12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23rd Supp.) (1981). 
 246. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EX-
PLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 
1984, at 1041–43 (Joint Comm. Print 1984). 
 247. Id. at 67–76. 
 248. Panel Report, United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corpo-
rations”, 207, WTO Doc. WT/DS108/R (Oct. 8, 1999). 
 249. FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-519, 114 Stat. 2423. 
 250. Panel Report, United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corpo-
rations”—Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, 60, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS108/RW (Aug. 20, 2001). 
 251. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 
1418 (2004). 
 252. Altmaier et al., supra note 228. The finance ministers note that the ex-
port regime is different from accepted patent box regimes in that it applies to 
intangible assets other than patents and copyright software, such as branding 
and other market-based intangibles. 
 253. Avi-Yonah, supra note 243, at 6–7.  
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To quote one senior GOP lobbyist: “[A]ny WTO challenge 
could threaten the existence or efficacy of the WTO because of 
this context. Or threaten the US willingness to continue as a 
member. As between tax cuts and the WTO, the GOP free trad-
ers would likely choose tax cuts.”254 In this scenario, the tax 
measures pursued in this bill may further destabilize the free-
trade order. Indeed, with the failure to reach new agreements at 
the WTO conference as U.S. tax reform was pending, there is 
already some indication that this is occurring.255 
To summarize, the special low rate of 13.125% in the Senate 
bill for export income is intended to encourage firms to keep and 
develop intangible property in the United States. Given its un-
certain legal status, however, firms will not be able to rely upon 
the change and will continue to locate IP offshore. It is thus un-
likely that the FDII regime will fulfill its intended purpose.  
2. Gaming Involving Round-Tripping Transactions 
Other technical problems will also arise from the new FDII 
regime, including new gaming opportunities. Under plausible in-
terpretations of the statute, taxpayers may be able to take ad-
vantage of the lower FDII rate in “round-tripping” transac-
tions—that is, selling to independent foreign distributors, who 
then resell back into the United States. Here, the concern is that 
domestic sales, which do not get the preferred FDII rate, will be 
successfully disguised as tax-preferred export sales.  
For instance, domestic corporations could sell to technically 
independent foreign distributors who resell into the United 
States, but with the domestic corporations imposing advertising 
and marketing requirements and price restrictions upon those 
distributors. This approach would give the domestic corporation 
substantial control without violating the technical independence 
of the distributors. Although the new tax legislation provides 
that taxpayers must establish to the satisfaction of the Treasury 
Secretary that the goods are sold for use abroad,256 taxpayers 
will likely take the position that the intent of an initial sale to a 
 
 254. Id. at 7 (quoting an anonymous senior GOP lobbyist).  
 255. Michael Nienaber, World Trade Order in a Wobble as Washington 
Snubs WTO Status Quo, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-global-economy-outlook/world-trade-order-in-a-wobble-as 
-washington-snubs-wto-status-quo-idUSKBN1E91GY. 
 256. H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 625 (2017) (Conf. Rep.). 
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foreign business is sufficient.257 It will be difficult for the IRS to 
meaningfully police these sorts of gaming transactions.  
Further exacerbating the round-tripping problem, the con-
ference report to the new tax legislation states that, “[i]f property 
is sold by a taxpayer to a person who is not a U.S. person, and 
after such sale the property is subject to manufacture, assembly, 
or other processing . . . outside the United States by such person, 
then the property is for a foreign use.”258 This presumably allows 
for round-tripping so long as there is some degree of foreign pro-
cessing, since otherwise this rule would not be necessary. It is 
possible that, by negative implication, the conferees aimed to im-
ply that a sale for re-importation purposes would not be consid-
ered to be for foreign use in the absence of further foreign pro-
cessing. But even if this interpretation of the negative 
implication is correct, there will be enormous pressure on the 
minimum amount of foreign processing necessary to qualify as 
foreign use, allowing re-importation into the United States.259  
Ultimately, then, whatever the interpretation, it is hard to 
see how the IRS could prevent numerous taxpayers from engag-
ing in round-tripping games to exploit the FDII regime. The legal 
and factual ambiguity inherent to any such enforcement at-
tempts will undoubtedly advantage taxpayers who seek to en-
gage in aggressive tax gaming, similar to the case with transfer-
pricing games.  
3. Other Perverse Incentives 
FDII also creates undesirable incentives to locate economic 
activity abroad, much like GILTI. Firms can obtain the lower 
FDII rate while having zero manufacturing or employees in the 
United States—buying goods from a foreign supplier for resale 
abroad is sufficient. Moreover, because the FDII rate applies to 
income in excess of a domestic corporation’s tangible assets,260 
domestic corporations can lower the hurdle necessary to obtain 
the favored rate by reducing tangible investments in the United 
States.  
 
 257. This would be akin to how a VAT regime would work, although Treas-
ury would likely contest this analogy as inappropriate given the differences be-
tween that type of regime and the FDII regime. 
 258. H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 625 n.1522. 
 259. Regulations to address this point will be necessary, although it is ques-
tionable how effective they can be given the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry. 
Thanks to Mike Schler for discussion of this point. 
 260. See I.R.C. § 250 (2017). 
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Perversely, the FDII rate also incentivizes firms to sell to 
foreign manufacturers rather than to domestic manufacturers. 
This is because a U.S. firm will be unable to obtain the FDII rate 
when it sells unfinished goods to an unrelated U.S. manufac-
turer (since this qualifies as a domestic sale), but will be able to 
obtain the FDII rate when it sells unfinished goods to a related 
or unrelated foreign manufacturer (since this qualifies as an ex-
port).  
Finally, although FDII is intended to attract IP to the 
United States, its rate of 13.125% simply cannot compete with 
GILTI’s rate of 10.5%, assuming the proper comparison is a tax 
haven. Even if a foreign country imposes tax at a rate of 13.125%, 
which equalizes the FDII rate if the foreign taxes are 80% cred-
itable, this only means that in such scenarios FDII is taxed equal 
to GILTI. 
4. Reform Possibilities 
In light of these troubling incentives for offshoring, the po-
tential for aggressive tax gaming, the legal uncertainty from 
drafting glitches, and the roadblocks arising from the likely in-
compatibility with WTO rules, we believe that the best course of 
action is for Congress to repeal FDII entirely. This is especially 
the case considering the mixed evidence as to whether even bet-
ter designed patent boxes increase R&D or employment.261 Prob-
lematically, FDII incentivizes marketing intangibles, goodwill, 
and going concern, rather than just R&D. Although there is a 
strong argument for incentivizing R&D because it generates pos-
itive spillover effects, the same cannot be true for these other 
kinds of IP.262 
If Congress nevertheless wishes to maintain FDII, at mini-
mum new legislation should establish improved anti-round-trip-
 
 261. Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, Interna-
tional Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 347, 375 (2013) (reviewing the literature to conclude that the 
effectiveness of patent boxes is mixed, only affecting the location of IP owner-
ship and income rather than R&D in some countries); see also Annette Alstad-
saeter et al., Patent Boxes Design, Patents Location, and Local R&D, 33 ECON. 
POL’Y 131 (2018) (finding that patent boxes tend to deter local innovation activ-
ities unless such regimes impose local R&D conditions); Pierre Mohnen et al., 
Evaluating the Innovation Box Tax Policy Instrument in the Netherlands, 2007–
13, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 141, 141 (2017) (finding that the patent box in 
the Netherlands has a positive effect on R&D but that the average firm only 
uses a portion of the tax advantage for extra R&D investment). 
 262. See Sanchirico, supra note 226, at 20. 
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ping rules to prevent the easy gaming of the export subsidy. Ab-
sent such legislation, Treasury should attempt to address such 
transactions through regulation. For instance, Treasury might 
use rules similar to those that determine destination under the 
base company rules to determine whether a sale is for foreign 
use.263 Problems with those rules, however, illustrate the diffi-
culties in addressing the round-tripping issue, especially 
through regulation rather than legislation.  
In particular, the base company regulations mandate that 
corporations determine the country of ultimate use “if at the 
time of a sale of personal property to an unrelated person the 
controlled foreign corporation knew, or should have known from 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, that 
the property probably would not be used, consumed, or disposed 
of in the country of destination . . . .”264 This leaves substantial 
wiggle room for there to be no duty for U.S. firms to determine 
which property will be resold into the United States when they 
sell property to an independent foreign party for resale. Thus, in 
light of the statutory requirement that taxpayers show to the 
satisfaction of Treasury that the property is exported for foreign 
use, Treasury should use its regulatory authority to impose an 
interpretation of the statute that requires U.S. manufacturers to 
do a real investigation of how much the foreign party will sell 
back into the United States. Yet, given the fact-intensive nature 
of the inquiry, it is admittedly unclear how effective any such 
regulations would be. 
Further, if the FDII is retained, we recommend closing the 
gap between the rates on FDII and GILTI to avoid taxing the 
export income more heavily than the foreign intangible income 
(an undesirable result given the aims of the reform). The confer-
ence report states the lower minimum tax rate under GILTI is 
justified because only 80% of the foreign tax credits are allowed 
to offset the minimum tax rate.265 This justification, however, 
does not hold if no or low foreign taxes are paid (for example, in 
tax havens), which are precisely the circumstances at which the 
GILTI regime is aimed. In such cases, firms will pay a 10.5% rate 
in the U.S. (or close to it). Given the goal of using the export rate 
to encourage firms to bring intellectual property back home, this 
policy choice is questionable. A rate somewhere in between 
 
 263. See Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(3)(ii) (2018). 
 264. Id.  
 265. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 649 (2017) (Conf. Rep.). The effective 
GILTI rate of 10.5% divided by 80% equals 13.125%. 
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10.5% and 13.125% could have been chosen to account for the tax 
haven problem.  
C. PROBLEMS WITH THE BEAT REGIME 
One of the more interesting provisions in the new tax legis-
lation is the new base erosion and anti-abuse tax (BEAT), which 
significantly strengthens U.S. taxation of inbound transac-
tions.266  
The BEAT targets base erosion of the U.S. tax base by im-
posing additional tax liability on certain U.S. corporations that 
excessively reduce their U.S. tax liability by making deductible 
payments to a 25% owned foreign affiliate.267 The BEAT applies 
to all multinational corporations, whether they are owned by a 
U.S. or by a foreign parent corporation.268  
The BEAT is a minimum tax that is calculated on an ex-
panded tax base called “modified taxable income,” which is de-
termined without regard to tax benefits, such as deductions, 
arising from “base erosion payments.”269 Base erosion payments, 
in turn, are defined as deductible amounts paid to the foreign 
affiliate,270 such as interest, amounts paid to the foreign affiliate 
in connection with depreciable or amortizable property,271 and 
certain reinsurance premiums.272 The minimum tax is equal to 
the excess of 10% of the modified taxable income over an amount 
equal to the taxpayer’s regular tax liability (reduced by certain 
credits).273  
The BEAT was conceived of as a punishment to companies 
that invert (that is, U.S. companies that change their domicile to 
a foreign country). Inversions were attractive under prior law, in 
part, because the U.S. entity could be loaded up with debt, 
thereby generating deductible interest payments to the new for-
eign parent and stripping income out of the U.S. tax base.274 
BEAT’s scope, however, is much wider that just this, applying to 
payments to foreign subsidiaries as well as foreign parents. 
 
 266. I.R.C. § 59A (2017).  
 267. Id.  
 268. Id.  
 269. Id. § 59A(c). 
 270. Id. § 59A(d)(1). 
 271. Id. § 59A(d)(2). 
 272. Id. § 59A(d)(3). 
 273. Id. § 59A(b)(1).  
 274. Avi-Yonah, supra note 243, at 3.  
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1. The Cost of Goods Sold Game 
Importantly, base erosion payments generally do not in-
clude payments for cost of goods sold.275 If a foreign affiliate in-
corporates the foreign intellectual property into a product and 
then sells the product back to a U.S. affiliate, the cost of the 
goods sold does not fall within BEAT.276 Even if the U.S. subsid-
iary pays a royalty to the foreign parent for the right to use a 
trademark on goods purchased by the subsidiary, the royalty 
must be capitalized into the costs of goods sold under pre-exist-
ing regulations, and therefore the royalty payments skip the 
BEAT entirely.277 This gap in the law leaves open significant 
gaming opportunities, ensuring that a good deal of base shifting 
will escape the regime. 
2. Matters of Thresholds 
Problematically, the scope of BEAT allows many multina-
tionals to fall outside of it. The BEAT regime only applies to cor-
porations that have average annual gross receipts in excess of 
$500 million over a three-year period.278 This is a very high 
threshold, leaving out many corporations that are engaging in 
substantial base shifting. To compare, in a similar setting fo-
cused on base erosion, the section 385 regulations identify large 
multinationals as having either $50 million in annual revenues 
or assets exceeding $100 million.279 These levels are much more 
appropriate for identifying multinationals with sufficient base 
shifting activity.280 
The BEAT regime is not triggered until there is a “base ero-
sion percentage” of at least three percent, or two percent for fi-
nancial groups.281 This creates a cliff effect, incentivizing compa-
nies to engage in structures to get just inside the line. For 
 
 275. H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 653 (2017) (Conf. Rep.). 
 276. See id. 
 277. Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(ii)(U) (2018). There is a question as to 
whether Congress intended such royalties to escape BEAT. One government of-
ficial has indicated that this was not the intent of Congress and that the out-
come may be changed through a technical correction. JASPER L. CUMMINGS, TAX 
NOTES, SELECTIVE ANALYSIS: THE BEAT 1763 (2018). 
 278. I.R.C. § 59A(e)(1)(B) (2017). 
 279. Id. § 385.  
 280. Bret Wells, Get with the Beat, 158 TAX NOTES 1023, 1023 (2018). 
 281. I.R.C. § 59A(e). The base erosion percentage is determined by dividing 
the deductions taken by the taxpayer with respect to its base erosion payments 
by the overall amount of deductions taken by the corporation (with some enu-
merated exceptions, such as for deductions in connection with GILTI and FDII). 
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instance, the domestic corporation could “check the box” on its 
foreign subsidiary to treat it as a “disregarded entity” for federal 
income tax purposes. In this manner, the subsidiary, and pay-
ments to it, would be ignored.  
Finally, because the BEAT is only assessed at a 10% rate, it 
allows deductions to offset over half the 21% percent corporate 
tax rate, a result that arguably does not punish base shifting 
sufficiently.282  
3. International Law Issues 
The BEAT also raises tax treaty issues, although the United 
States will almost certainly take the position that these concerns 
should be dismissed.283 A group of EU Ministers, in raising the 
previously discussed WTO issues in the FDII regime, asserted 
that the BEAT regime could discriminate against foreign com-
panies in violation of bilateral tax treaties and could constitute 
unfair trade practices because it also encompasses non-abusive 
transactions.284 
Article 24(5) of our double tax treaties provides that a treaty 
partner cannot tax residents of the other treaty country more 
heavily than its own residents.285 Arguably, the BEAT violates 
 
Id. § 59A(c)(4). 
 282. Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at n.4. 
 283. There is also a question as to the consequences that flow from the BEAT 
conflicting with the tax treaties. One understanding is that if the BEAT contra-
dicts the treaties, courts must abide by the “later in time” rule to nonetheless 
apply the BEAT as written, omitting foreign tax credits and applying it to non-
deductible payments to residents in the treaty country. This is because under 
the U.S. Constitution, treaties and statutes are both “supreme law” and the 
Court has held that, when there is a conflict between the two, the one enacted 
“later in time” will prevail. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). A 
contrary view argues that courts should not find that a statute has overridden 
a treaty unless Congress has clearly expressed its will to do so. Under this view, 
courts must reinterpret the BEAT to allow for deductions to related persons 
resident in treaty countries and foreign tax credits for foreign taxes paid to 
treaty countries. See H. David Rosenbloom & Fadi Shaheen, The BEAT and the 
Treaties, 92 TAX NOTES INT’L 1 (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=3229532. Some of us have argued the former and disagreed 
with the latter view. Reuven Avi-Yonah & Bret Wells, The BEAT and Treaty 
Overrides: A Brief Response to Rosenbloom and Shaheen (Univ. of Mich. Pub. 
Law Research Paper No. 617, Aug. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=3232974; Rebecca M. Kysar, Will Tax Treaties and WTO Rules 
‘Beat’ the Beat?, COLUM. J. TAX L. MATTERS (forthcoming 2018); Rebecca M. 
Kysar, Unraveling the Tax Treaty (draft on file with authors). 
 284. Stephanie Soong Johnston, EU Finance Ministers Fire Warning Shot 
On U.S. Tax Reform, 157 TAX NOTES 1704, 1704 (2017). 
 285. The model tax treaty provides:  
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this nondiscrimination clause because a foreign-owned U.S. en-
tity will be subject to the BEAT regime whereas a U.S.-owned 
U.S. entity will not be. One rejoinder to this argument is that the 
BEAT applies regardless of who ultimately owns the corpora-
tion.286 Thus, the BEAT applies to payments from a U.S. entity 
to a foreign entity that is owned by the U.S. entity (a CFC), 
which indicates that “the intent was to protect the U.S. tax base 
rather than to discriminate against foreign-owned U.S. par-
ties.”287  
Another arguable path to treaty violation is Article 24(4), 
which commands that foreign residents be entitled to deductions 
“under the same conditions” as U.S. residents.288 The BEAT re-
gime, however, is not equivalent to the denial of a deduction and 
interest, royalties, and other items remain fully deductible. In-
stead, the BEAT merely subjects the tax benefit conferred by de-
ducting interest, royalties, and other items to the ten percent 
tax; denying a tax deduction would increase the tax on the item 
by 21%, not 10%.289 Additionally, the base erosion rules are ar-
guably sanctioned under Article 24(4) because they are neces-
sary to arrive at an appropriate arm’s length result within the 
meaning of Article 9 of the treaties.290 
Article 23 of the treaties also requires treaty partners to 
grant a foreign tax credit for income tax of the treaty partner “in 
accordance with the provisions and subject to the limitations of 
the law of the United States (as it may be amended from time to 
 
Enterprises of a Contracting State, the capital of which is wholly or 
partly owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more resi-
dents of the other Contracting State, shall not be subjected in the first-
mentioned Contracting State to any taxation or any requirement con-
nected therewith that is more burdensome than the taxation and con-
nected requirements to which other similar enterprises of the first-
mentioned Contracting State are or may be subjected. 
TREASURY DEP’T, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 24(5) 
(2016) [hereinafter MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION]. 
 286. Although a harsher result applies to foreign companies that were for-
merly U.S. companies, such disparate treatment is likely within the savings 
clause of the treaties, which allows the United States to tax its residents, and 
former residents, under its own domestic law. Id. at arts. 1(4), 4(1); see also 
Wells, supra note 280.  
 287. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Beat It: Tax Reform and Tax Treaties (Univ. of 
Mich. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 587, Jan. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096879. 
 288. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, supra note 285, at art. 24(4). 
 289. Avi-Yonah, supra note 287. 
 290. Wells, supra note 280, at 1026.  
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time without changing the general principle hereof).”291 Since 
the BEAT offers no foreign tax credit, it may violate the “general 
principle” of Article 23.292  
There are, however, cogent arguments against this view. 
One could characterize the BEAT as simply a limitation on the 
foreign tax credit because a portion of regular tax liability still 
receives relief from double taxation in the form of foreign tax 
credits.293 Another argument is that the BEAT may not be a “cov-
ered tax” under Article 2 of the treaties since it is an alternative 
regime to the income tax and therefore not subject to the require-
ments of Article 23.294 
The treaty analysis of the BEAT looks even stronger when 
compared with the original House inbound provision that would 
have imposed a 20% excise tax to all deductible payments to for-
eign related parties, including cost of goods sold. In contrast to 
the BEAT, the excise tax would have also likely abrogated our 
bilateral tax treaties by effectively imposing a withholding tax 
on royalties (Article 9) and by undermining the treaties’ arm’s 
length principle (Article 12), permanent establishment (Article 
7), and nondiscrimination (Article 24) requirements. 
All of that being said, the nondiscrimination and double tax 
relief provisions in the tax treaties are vague and contentious. 
The United States can thus likely expect pressure from our 
treaty partners to scale back the inbound regime on a bilateral 
basis. It is unclear, however, how successful any such efforts will 
be. This is especially so given that Europe’s response to the in-
bound base erosion problem in the form of ad hoc state aid cases 
and digital tax proposals could itself be accused of being discrim-
inatory against certain multinational corporations.295 Addition-
ally, many of our treaty partners have enacted new taxes in the 
 
 291. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, supra note 285, at art. 23(2). 
 292. See Rosenbloom & Shaheen, supra note 283. 
 293. Avi-Yonah & Wells, supra note 283.  
 294. Id. “Covered taxes” are federal income taxes imposed by the Internal 
Revenue Code or “any identical or substantially similar taxes that are imposed 
after the date of signature of this Convention in addition to, or in place of, the 
existing taxes.” MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, supra note 285, at art. 2.  
 295. See Wells, supra note 280, at 1030. For a general discussion of the geo-
political dynamics surrounding BEAT, see Itai Grinberg, The BEAT Is a Prag-
matic and Geopolitically Savvy Inbound Base Erosion Rule (Nov. 12, 2017) (un-
published manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3069770. 
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past several years that are of questionable status with regard to 
the treaties’ scope.296 
The BEAT also arguably presents WTO problems and may 
be viewed as a forbidden tariff, although this argument is much 
less serious than the WTO problems presented by FDII. Interest 
and royalties do not create a WTO issue, so only imports of de-
preciable property from related parties and imports from certain 
inverted corporations will implicate the agreements.297 The level 
of WTO-covered import activity subject to increased taxation, 
however, may be insufficient to raise the ire of our trading part-
ners.298 This is in contrast to the House excise tax proposal. Be-
cause it encompassed cost of goods sold, the excise tax would 
have caused much more significant WTO problems.299 
4. Taxpayer Unfriendly Glitches 
Although our primary concern is with the under-inclusive-
ness of the BEAT regime, in some narrow circumstances, the 
BEAT might also be characterized as being over-inclusive 
through a number of unfriendly taxpayer quirks. For instance, 
although there is an exception for qualified derivate payments 
to accommodate intercompany swaps and other derivatives, or-
dinary course transactions such as repurchase agreements and 
posted collateral, as well as certain debt instruments mandated 
by regulators constitute base erosion payments.300 BEAT also 
captures routine transactions such as a foreign finance affiliate 
borrowing for the group and on-lending at cost around the group. 
As a result, taxpayers may be penalized under BEAT for non-
abusive transactions. 
 
 296. See Roland Ismer & Christoph Jescheck, The Substantive Scope of Tax 
Treaties in a Post-BEPS World: Article 2 OECD MC (Taxes Covered) and the 
Rise of New Taxes, 45 INTERTAX 382, 386–87 (2017).  
 297. Reuven Avi-Yonah & Gianluca Mazzoni, Tit for Tax: How Will Other 
Countries React to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act? (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Re-
search Paper No. 581, Dec. 21, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3089052. 
 298. Under the letter from the European finance ministers to Secretary 
Mnuchin, mentioned above, however, WTO concerns were not mentioned explic-
itly in connection to BEAT (although the letter did mention “unfair trade prac-
tices” in that context). Johnston, supra note 284. 
 299. Avi-Yonah, supra note 243, at 3. 
 300. The New ‘Not Quite Territorial’ International Tax Regime, DAVIS POLK 
& WARDWELL LLP, at 13 (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.davispolk.com/files/2017 
-12-20_gop_tax_cuts_jobs_act_preview_new_tax_regime.pdf. 
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Additionally, foreign banks often operate in the United 
States through branches. The rules do not appear to exempt pay-
ments by U.S. groups to foreign related parties who treat such 
payments as effectively connected income (and hence are subject 
to U.S. taxation), thus creating a particularly harsh result for 
taxpayers.  
Finally, a firm may not pay the minimum tax on GILTI be-
cause they have paid foreign tax. In measuring BEAT, however, 
the firm has to include GILTI because foreign tax credits are not 
allowed in the calculation.301 This could also be judged as an un-
justified incongruence between the regimes.302 
We point out these issues not because, on balance, we think 
the BEAT is too hostile to taxpayers. Indeed, we think the base 
shifting opportunities still left open by the regime outweigh the 
aforementioned taxpayer concerns. Yet, in particular instances, 
the results created by the BEAT may be disproportionately felt 
by particular industries, thus destabilizing the regime some-
what.  
5. Reform Possibilities 
There are several paths that Congress might pursue to im-
prove the BEAT regime. For one, the BEAT should apply to cor-
porations that have less than $500 million revenue since these 
firms also engage in base erosion and profit shifting. The reve-
nue threshold should be substantially lowered, and an asset test 
should be added, mirroring those in the section 385 regulations. 
Also, the three percent base erosion percentage threshold, which 
creates a cliff effect in the law, should be eliminated. Further, 
Congress should consider raising the BEAT rate, which is cur-
rently set at a relatively low 10%.  
 
 301. Thanks to Ed Kleinbard for this point. 
 302. There are numerous other technical problems and unanswered ques-
tions left open by BEAT, particularly with regard to services, as others have 
explored. See, e.g., Manal Corwin et al., A Response to an Off-BEAT Analysis, 
158 TAX NOTES 933 (2018) (arguing that BEAT exempts the cost component of 
marked-up services); Martin A. Sullivan, Can Marked-Up Services Skip the 
BEAT?, 158 TAX NOTES 705, 705 (2018) (discussing a debate over “which tax-
payer payments to foreign related parties are excluded from the definition of 
base erosion payments potentially subject to the BEAT”); Martin A. Sullivan, 
Marked-Up Services and the BEAT, Part II, 158 TAX NOTES 1169, 1169 (2018) 
(discussing the applicability of BEAT to certain types of payments); Laura Da-
vison, Most Wanted: Tax Pros’ Technical Corrections Wish List, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.bna.com/wanted-tax-pros-n57982091110 (discuss-
ing ambiguity regarding which payments are included and how to aggregate 
income).  
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The BEAT workaround involving cost of goods sold will cre-
ate planning opportunities going forward and restructuring of 
the supply chain. Unfortunately, however, there is no easy solu-
tion to this problem given the fact that inclusion of cross-border 
sales of inventory would present WTO problems, similar to those 
presented by the House excise tax.  
D. TAX COMPETITION 
Finally, supporters of the new tax legislation sometimes as-
sume that lowering the statutory corporate tax rate to below the 
OECD average of 25% will result in considerable investment into 
the United States. Yet other countries will likely respond to the 
changes enacted by the legislation by engaging in tax competi-
tion.303 For instance, other countries may cut their foreign tax 
rates further below the new U.S. rate of twenty-one percent.304 
They may also adopt patent boxes in response to the lower rate 
on exported intangibles or may impose greater taxation on U.S. 
subsidiaries of their own multinationals through rules similar to 
our controlled foreign corporation rules.305 All of these realistic 
responses might reduce the growth effects of the legislation and 
interfere with the intended aims of the new regime. In fact, there 
is already evidence that other countries have begun to contem-
plate changes to their own rate structures in response to the new 
U.S. taxing environment.306 
 
 303. A classic example of tax competition is the 1984 U.S. abolishment of a 
withholding tax on foreign residents who earned portfolio interest. This sparked 
a “race to the bottom” among governments across the globe, leading to the cur-
rent state of affairs whereby most countries do not tax interest on debt held by 
foreign persons. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, A Coordinated Withholding Tax on 
Deductive Payments, 119 TAX NOTES 993, 993–94 (2008).  
 304. This point comes from Dan Shaviro. Note that predictions of an uptick 
in inbound investment are in tension with the fact that we continue to exist in 
a low interest rate environment in which corporate CEOs report that capital 
access presents no constraints on undertaking projects at the margin. However, 
even if there are no capital allocation effects, the perception by other countries 
will be that the United States has made a strong tax competitive move here. 
The rates in other counties may well come down in response. This will aggravate 
the new incentive we have created to move tangible assets out of the United 
States, as discussed under the GILTI regime. This point comes from Mitchell 
Kane. 
 305. For further discussion, see Avi-Yonah & Mazzoni, supra note 297, at 1. 
 306. Laura Davison, U.S. Tax Overhaul Spurs Others to Re-Evaluate Rates: 
Tax Counsel, BLOOMBERG DAILY TAX REP. (Feb. 22, 2018) (quoting one of the 
key drafters of the tax bill, who has met with representatives from other coun-
tries who are looking to model tax law changes after those in the United States).  
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V.  OTHER TECHNICAL PROBLEMS   
Although we cannot possibly explain all of the technical 
problems in the tax legislation within this Article, a few addi-
tional issues seem sufficiently important that we feel compelled 
to discuss at least briefly. We thus explain two additional games 
and one additional glitch, below.  
A. OTHER GAMES 
There are many other games that will be played under the 
new rules created by the tax legislation, undermining revenue 
collection and the integrity of the tax code—and leading to inef-
ficient behavior. Here we explain two of the most important of 
these new games. 
1. Circumventing the Interest Limitation 
One of the most important revenue-raising and anti-abuse 
provisions of the tax legislation is the new cap on business inter-
est expense deductions, with the cap being set at 30% of an ad-
justed measure of profits.307 This interest limitation is consid-
ered a necessary rule to prevent businesses from deriving a 
double benefit from the purchase and expensing of debt-financed 
property.308  
However, the tax legislation leaves a door open through 
which taxpayers can game around this crucial interest limita-
tion.309 This game is easier for pass-through entities than for cor-
porations, and so we will explain the pass-through version of this 
game first.  
The basic game is to pay out preferred returns on equity in-
stead of interest. An attorney who specializes in structuring fi-
nancial transactions explains the basic version of this game as 
follows:  
Consider a business that currently has interest expense of $40 on $100 
of [earnings] consisting of $30 interest expense on senior debt and $10 
 
 307. I.R.C. § 163(j) (2017). Note that the cap excludes interest earned by the 
business, which may be fully offset by interest paid. 
 308. ALAN COLE, INTEREST DEDUCTIBILITY—ISSUES AND REFORMS, TAX 
FOUNDATION FISCAL FACT NO. 548, at 2 (May 2017) (discussing proposed re-
forms to limit interest deductibility). 
 309. Our explanation of this game builds on analysis in an earlier blog post 
by one of us. See Daniel Hemel, How to Skirt the Cap on Interest Deductions in 
the GOP Tax Plan . . . and to Make Some Money While You’re at It, MEDIUM: 
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of interest expense on subordinated debt. Assume that none of the 
[prior] law limitations on interest deductibility apply to this business 
(which would be the typical case). Under the [tax legislation], the busi-
ness will be limited to a $30 interest deduction and $10 will be disal-
lowed. 
  Commenters have long noted that preferred equity in a partnership 
provides the equivalent of a tax deductible financing expense (among 
other alternatives to debt such as leasing arrangements and certain 
derivatives). Thus, if the business described above were a partnership, 
it could issue preferred equity to repay the subordinated debt (bringing 
its interest expense within the $30 deductibility limit). The preferred 
equity could be allocated/distributed a fixed annual amount of partner-
ship income (for simplicity, say $10), economically similar to the previ-
ous subordinated debt interest expense. This would divert taxable in-
come away from the common equity partners, with similar effect to 
preserving interest deductibility for the full $40 of financing ex-
pense.310 
In other words, a partnership can game around the crucial 
new interest limitation by substituting some amount of pre-
ferred equity for debt. The preferred equity can be structured to 
be economically equivalent to the debt it is replacing.311 Yet the 
preferred equity payments would generate the same tax conse-
quences as would uncapped debt payments. 
Moreover, corporate taxpayers can also play this game, alt-
hough additional steps are needed for them. Were a corporate 
taxpayer to try the same maneuver directly, that corporate tax-
payer would receive no tax benefit, because dividends are not 
deductible to corporate taxpayers.312 Thus, corporate taxpayers 
 
 310. This attorney wishes to remain anonymous, so as to facilitate alerting 
policymakers and the public to this game, while still advising clients on how to 
take advantage of the game. See id. 
 311. As the attorney elaborates, 
the preferred equity would not have an identical credit profile to the 
subordinated debt it replaced. However, for many businesses, that pro-
file would be similar, or similar enough that the tax benefit would ex-
ceed the marginal cost of financing using preferred equity rather than 
debt. Businesses could also engage in structuring to enhance the credit 
profile of the preferred equity — for example, by carving off a particu-
larly low-risk business line into a partnership subsidiary and issuing 
the preferred equity out of that subsidiary (without an upstream guar-
antee). In other words, issuers would retain wide flexibility to structure 
the credit profile of their financing in an optimal manner. 
Id. 
 312. This is in contrast to profit shares paid out by a partnership, which will 
now, under the new rules of the tax legislation, be taxed preferentially relative 
to potentially capped debt financing. This is because profit shares paid out are 
essentially deductible to the partnership, and only taxed once at the individual 
level, due to the absence of an entity level “double” tax on partnership income 
like there is for corporate income. Further exacerbating this differential tax 
treatment, investors who hold preferred equity-like interests in partnerships 
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would need to establish a partnership subsidiary that would 
then issue the preferred equity used to pay off the capped portion 
of the prior debt financing. As the same attorney elaborates:  
If the business were a corporation, similar planning would be available. 
The corporation could drop its operations into a partnership subsidiary 
(likely achievable as a reorganization without the burden of actually 
transferring assets, etc.), and the partnership subsidiary could issue 
the preferred equity. If the debt remained at the parent corp level, the 
partnership sub could provide an upstream guarantee to avoid poten-
tial structural subordination of the senior debt.313 
The primary obstacle for either partnership or corporate taxpay-
ers wishing to play this game, then, is to find a counterparty 
willing to fund the preferred debt that is to be used to pay off the 
capped portion of the prior debt financing. This should not be 
especially difficult for well-advised taxpayers to arrange. Indeed, 
the tax legislation effectively subsidizes counterparties willing 
to fund these sorts of swapping-preferred-equity-for-debt-financ-
ing games, due to the new pass-through deduction. The same at-
torney again elaborates:  
It seems there are some additional goodies, amounting to an apparent 
tax subsidy for the finance provider in this structure. Consider a high 
net worth US individual (or a partnership of multiple high net worth 
individuals) being the new preferred equity partner. These new pre-
ferred equity partners would earn $10 ordinary income from their part-
nership interest, generally taxed at the same rate as interest income. 
However, it appears they could also qualify for [the new 20% pass-
through deduction] on this income . . . .  
. . . . 
. . . So, historic equity holders retain the benefit of $40 of deductible 
financing expense, while the finance provider receives a subsidy in the 
form of a 20% deduction for participating in the preferred equity struc-
ture versus an investment in debt.314 
Altogether, then, at least for sophisticated and well-advised tax-
payers who are able to put together the necessary financing ar-
rangements, the tax legislation’s crucial new interest expense 
limitation can readily be gamed around. But could the IRS take 
action to prevent this game?  
In theory, Treasury and the IRS might attempt to use their 
broad powers under section 385(a) of the Internal Revenue Code 
to “prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropri-
ate to determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be 
treated . . . as stock or indebtedness.”315 However, those section 
 
potentially would be eligible for the new 20% pass-through deduction. Id. 
 313. Id.  
 314. Id.  
 315. I.R.C. § 285(a) (2017). 
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385 powers would seem not to apply in cases where a subsidiary 
partnership of the corporation (rather than the corporation it-
self) issues debt-like preferred equity. 
Alternatively, the IRS might try to attack this game by re-
characterizing partnership-preferred equity as debt under sec-
tion 707(c), which applies to guaranteed payments by a partner-
ship.316 However, as the provision is currently codified, section 
707(c) applies only for the purposes of specific code sections and 
subsections, and does not apply to the new cap on interest de-
ductions under section 163(j).317  
Overall, new legislation will probably be needed in order to 
combat this game so as to meaningfully enforce the new cap on 
interest expense deductions.  
2. Circumventing the Limitations on Deducting Executive 
Compensation 
Above, we explained how a corporate taxpayer could estab-
lish a pass-through subsidiary in order to circumvent the new 
interest expense limitation. But this is not the only game that 
can be played by stacking corporate and partnership structures 
into stacks of entities so as to arbitrage the different rules that 
apply to corporations and to partnerships. 
Another game that can be played by stacking a corporation 
on top of a pass-through entity (sometimes called an Up-C struc-
ture318) would circumvent the new limitations on deducting ex-
ecutive compensation. Specifically, the tax legislation amended 
section 162(m) to further limit public (and certain private) com-
panies’ ability to deduct salaries paid in excess of $1 million.  
The game here is to transform highly paid executives (whose 
compensation would otherwise be subject to this new limit) into 
partners of a partnership subsidiary of the corporation.319 These 
executives would then be paid portions of their compensation in 
the form of allocations of income via the partnership.320 Because 
these allocations would not be considered salary or wages, this 
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structure would circumvent the new section 162(m) limita-
tions.321  
B. MISCELLANEOUS ITEMIZED DEDUCTION GLITCHES 
The tax legislation completely suspends miscellaneous item-
ized deductions for tax years 2018 through 2025.322 Miscellane-
ous itemized deductions were already heavily restricted under 
prior law, which resulted in hardship for a number of taxpay-
ers.323 Yet, despite those prior limitations, miscellaneous item-
ized deductions previously provided important—and appropri-
ate—write offs for some taxpayers. Those write offs are now 
completely denied.  
Consider the tax treatment of contingency fees for lawyers 
in legal settlements in cases involving issues like defamation, 
intentional infliction of emotional damage, and punitive dam-
ages. Under both prior and current law, plaintiffs must generally 
include the entire amount of damage awards in the plaintiffs’ 
income, even though a portion of that damage award (typically 
40%) must usually be paid to the plaintiff’s attorney.324 Under 
prior law, the plaintiff could then deduct the amount paid to the 
attorney for the contingency fee as a miscellaneous itemized de-
duction. But now, with miscellaneous itemized deductions no 
longer available, these plaintiffs will no longer be able to deduct 
any portion of the contingency amounts paid to plaintiffs’ attor-
neys (even as the lawyer is also taxed on the contingency fee be-
ing paid). 
To illustrate, consider a plaintiff receiving a $10,000 dam-
age award, of which 40% is owed to the plaintiff’s attorney as 
contingency. Imagine that the plaintiff is in the top 37% individ-
ual income tax bracket. After paying both the contingency fee (of 
$4,000) and the federal individual income tax payment on the 
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entire damage award (of $3,700), the plaintiff would be left with 
only $2300 of the damage award ($10,000 – $7,700). 
Now consider that the plaintiff may also need to pay state 
and local taxes on the entire $10,000 damage award and that the 
plaintiff may further need to compensate the attorney for ex-
penses incurred (with this payment also being non-deductible). 
In some scenarios, adding these additional payments could cause 
a plaintiff to lose money as a result of needing to pay a damage 
award. For instance, Gregg Polsky has explained a scenario in 
which a plaintiff could receive a $500,000 jury award, but then 
consequently be required to pay $300,000 to the plaintiff’s attor-
ney and $250,000 in combined federal and state and local 
taxes.325 Thus, this plaintiff would be made $50,000 worse off on 
account of winning the jury award. 
Although Polsky’s example involves more extreme hardship 
than will typically be the case, many similarly situated taxpay-
ers will take home only a small percentage of damage awards 
received after paying taxes and attorney’s fees. Indeed, some tax-
payers will indeed be made overall worse off from receiving a 
damage award, as in Polsky’s scenario. This demonstrates the 
unwarranted hardship created by completely denying miscella-
neous itemized deductions for all taxpayers—another glitch that 
should be fixed.  
  CONCLUSION   
In this Article, we explain many of the most problematic 
games, roadblocks, and glitches created by the 2017 tax legisla-
tion. However, we emphasize again that the new tax legislation 
contains many other technical problems beyond those that we 
discuss here. Indeed, tax lawyers and accountants continue to 
discover new games, roadblocks, and glitches as they ponder the 
application of the new provisions to the facts and circumstances 
of their taxpayer clients.326 
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The question now should be: Where do we go from here? Di-
agnosing the problems plaguing our new tax laws ought to be a 
precursor to working toward solutions. 
Some of the problems we explained can and should be solved 
through relatively minor legislative or regulatory fixes. But 
many of the problems that we identify do not have easy solu-
tions. A thorough deliberative process will thus be needed to en-
sure that future attempts at tax reform do not repeat the mis-
takes of this recent tax legislation. 
We hope that this Article will initiate discussions about po-
tential approaches for future reform. So as to not repeat the mis-
takes of the past, we must aim to learn from this recent historical 
episode, wherein a rushed and secretive process resulted in 
deeply flawed tax legislation. Future revenue needs are pre-
dicted to be dire,327 and American taxpayers deserve better. 
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